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RECOVERY OF ECONOMIC LOSSES UNDER THE 
MASSACHUSETTS OIL AND HAZARDOUS MATERIAL 
RELEASE PREVENTION AND RESPONSE ACT: 
CHAPTER 21E 
Karen Beth Clark* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Environmental litigation has increased drastically in the 1990s.1 
Much of this litigation has focused on the effects of environmental 
contamination on businesses.2 A business traditionally suffers injury 
due to hazardous waste releases in the form of property damage or 
economic 10ss.3 When a business sustains damage to its property 
through a hazardous waste release that has emanated from an outside 
source, or that was present when the business took possession of the 
property, the cleanup process is often long and costly.4 More impor-
tantly, however, businesses also suffer effects of hazardous waste 
releases that are as devastating, if not more so, than property dam-
age.5 These effects are called economic losses, and they may be in-
curred in a variety of ways.6 
During the cleanup of hazardous waste contamination a nearby 
business may be required to temporarily shut down its operations so 
as to eliminate any potential danger to its employees.7 This temporary 
* Managing Editor, 1993-1994, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 David P. Rosenblatt & Joseph J. Floyd, Private Environmental Litigation on the Rise, 20 
M.L.W. 1507, 1507 (1992). 
2 [d. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
5 J' Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 64 (Cal. 1979). 
6 See Rosenblatt & Floyd, supra note 1, at 1507. 
7 [d. 
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shut-down will likely cause an interruption in the business and the 
loss of valuable profits.8 Furthermore, clean-up efforts may be so 
extensive, or the costs so exorbitant, that a business may be forced 
to shut down permanently given its inability to operate or to afford 
the clean-up expenses.9 
Increasingly, businesses faced with economic losses caused by haz-
ardous waste cleanup are seeking judicial remedies to recover for 
these 10sses.1O To aid in their efforts, these plaintiffs are employing 
both federal and state environmental statutory schemes along with 
the common law.ll 
The primary vehicle for recovering the costs of hazardous waste 
cleanup, under federal law, is the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).12 CERCLA 
authorizes the government to clean up hazardous waste releases, to 
recover their response costs from responsible parties, and to mandate 
hazardous waste cleanup directly by those responsible for a releaseP 
In addition, many states have enacted legislation closely resembling 
CERCLA.14 The Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release 
Prevention and Response Act, (chapter 21E) is such a statute.15 Like 
its federal counterpart, chapter 21E authorizes the Massachusetts 
Department of Environmental Protection to clean up hazardous sub-
stance releases and permits the Commonwealth to recover its related 
expenses from the parties responsible for these releases.16 Chapter 
21E also holds parties that are responsible for hazardous substance 
releases liable to those who have suffered damage to their property 
as a result of the releaseY Accordingly, chapter 21E provides recov-
ery for damage to a person's "real or personal property."18 This statu-
tory language, however, is ambiguous in that it fails to clearly state 
whether a party responsible for a release is liable under the statute 
8 Id. at 1508. 
9Id. 
10Id. at 1507. 
11 Id. 
1242 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
13 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604--9607 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); Donald R. Frederico & Richard H. Baird, 
Introduction: A Brief Overview of Federal and Massachusetts Environmental Laws, 75 MASS. 
L. REV. 91, 94 (1990). 
14 Elaine C. Warren, State Hazardous Waste Superfunds and CERCLA Conflict or Comple-
ment?, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 10,348 (Nov. 1983). 
15 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, §§ 1-18 (1992); Frederico & Baird, supra note 13, at 94; Lee P. 
Breckenridge, Superfund Enforcement in Massachusetts, 452 ALI-ABA 19, 19 (1989). 
16 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, §§ 4-5 (1992). 
17 ch. 21E, § 5. 
18Id. 
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to a business for economic losses such as lost profits, lost sales, and 
business interruption damages.19 
While economic losses are often as great, if not greater than, any 
property damage or physical injury,2° many courts have denied plain-
tiffs recovery for their purely economic losses.21 The courts' worthy 
concerns focus on the possibility of resulting unlimited liability, mass 
litigation, frivolous suits, and the imposition of liability dispropor-
tional to the defendant's fault.22 Yet despite these concerns, many 
courts and legislatures have, in certain circumstances, allowed for the 
recovery of purely economic 10sses.23 
This Comment explores the recovery of economic losses under 
chapter 21E by innocent businesses faced with the effects of hazard-
ous waste contamination on nearby property that has affected their 
operations in a purely economic manner. The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court has addressed the issue of economic loss recovery and 
held that plaintiffs may not recover for purely economic losses under 
chapter 21E.24 This interpretation, however, is inadequate and is re-
futed by the common law, as well as by other state and federal statu-
tory schemes which regulate the cleanup of hazardous waste.25 Section 
II of this Comment focuses on the definition of economic 10sses.26 
Section III then analyzes the treatment of economic losses under the 
common law, as well as under federal and state statutory schemes.27 
This section then discusses chapter 21E's ambiguous treatment of 
economic 10sses.28 Section IV focuses on the recent Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court opinion denying the recovery of economic 
19 See id.; Rosenblatt & Floyd, supra note 1, at 1507. 
20 J' Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 64 (Cal. 1979). 
21 Kelly M. Hnatt, Purely Economic Loss: A Standard far Recrrvery, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1181, 
1181-82 & n.3 (1988). Purely economic losses are those unaccompanied by physical injury or 
property damage. Id. at 1181. Courts allow for the recovery of economic losses when they are 
accompanied by either physical injury or property damage. See id. 
22 Id. at 1183. "[Al court usually perceives the physical consequences of negligence as limited, 
but it considers indirect economic injury as unbounded." Id. Courts also note other concerns 
such as, "the risk of an increase in fraudulent claims, the potential for mass litigation, and the 
possibility of unlimited liability, ... the waste of limited resources in distinguishing fraudulent 
claims from valid losses, ... and the fear of disproportionate liability in the form of large, 
speculative jury verdicts that would be wholly out of proportion to a defendant's fault." Id. 
23 Pegeen Mulhern, Marine Pollution, Fisheries, and the Pillars of the Land: A Tort Recrrvery 
Standard for Pure Economic Losses, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 85, 95 (1990); see infra notes 
99-176 and accompanying text. 
24 Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 613 N.E.2d 92, 94-95 (Mass. 1993). 
25 See infra notes 295-345 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 31-47 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 48-233 and accompanying text. 
28 See infra notes 234-70 and accompanying text. 
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losses under chapter 21E and suggests that the court's analysis was 
flawed.29 Finally, Section V proposes that the Massachusetts Legisla-
ture amend chapter 21E to allow for the limited recovery of economic 
losses according to a standard based on a defendant's ability to foresee 
that a class of plaintiffs would incur economic 10sses.3o 
II. ECONOMIC LOSSES 
Economic losses have become increasingly important in the context 
of hazardous waste contamination and its effect on businesses. Eco-
nomic losses are defined by author Pegeen Mulhern as encompassing 
those losses that are neither a result of physical injury or property 
damage.3! Such a definition, however, is far from helpful. Yet despite 
the wide-spread use of the term economic loss, courts and commenta-
tors have failed to provide a more consistent and concise definition. 
For example, one author has defined an action to recover for economic 
losses as "an action brought to recover damages for inadequate value, 
costs of repair, and replacement of defective goods or consequent loss 
of profits-without any claim of personal injury or damage to other 
property."32 Another author has stated that purely economic loss is 
"the financial harm arising out of wrongful interference with plain-
tiff's contractual relations or with his or her non-contractual prospec-
tive gain."33 
Given the lack of a consistent definition, it is more instructive to 
determine what types of losses are categorized as economic harm in 
order to better understand the concept of economic loss. Economic 
losses may manifest themselves in a variety of forms. For example, 
economic losses often occur in the form of lost profits, business inter-
ruption damages, lost earnings, and losses of prospective economic 
advantage.34 They may also exist in the form of consequential eco-
nomic losses such as increased overhead, clean-up costs, and repair 
costs, as well as the loss of expected proceeds, lost opportunities, and 
damages paid to third parties resulting from a defendant's negli-
29 See infra notes 271--,'345 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 346-94 and accompanying text. 
31 Mulhern, supra note 23, at 86. 
32 Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 917, 918 
(1966). 
33 Mario J. Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 281, 
281 (1982). 
34 Mulhern, supra note 23, at 87. 
1994] CHAPTER 21E 515 
gence.35 Economic losses may also include business overhead ex-
penses, travel expenses, and efforts to minimize damage.36 
A business may experience economic losses due to an environ-
mental release in a variety of different ways. For example, a business 
may experience a loss if it is forced to shut down temporarily or 
permanently in order to clean up hazardous materials.37 When a busi-
ness must temporarily close its doors, the method used to measure 
the economic loss is usually a lost profits analysis.3s Such a valuation 
involves calculating the value of the sales opportunities that were lost 
due to the defendant's conduct.39 A business also may be forced to 
close down permanently due to a release of hazardous waste on 
nearby property that has severely affected its operations in a purely 
economic manner.40 In this case, the economic losses incurred by the 
business would most likely be the current market value of the busi-
ness in an uncontaminated condition.41 
A business may also incur an economic loss in the value of its assets 
if it continues to operate while it undertakes to clean up a hazardous 
waste release.42 In this case, the business may experience difficulty in 
marketing its assets due to the contamination problem and may even 
find that its assets are incapable of being sold at fair value.43 The 
business may be required to sell its assets at lower prices due to the 
"taint" of the environmental contamination.44 This discount is referred 
to as a diminution in value and is subject to a variety of different 
calculations .45 
The recovery of economic losses has long been debated in the courts 
and legislatures of the United States.46 The Massachusetts Legisla-
ture alluded to the recovery of these losses in chapter 21E but used 
35 Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1187-88 & n.26. 
36 Mulhern, supra note 23, at 87. 
37 Rosenblatt & Floyd, supra note 1, at 1508. 
38 See id. 
39 [d. This valuation also considers the company's lost contribution to the profits from those 
lost sales. [d. This contribution of the company's profits from lost sales is commonly called the 
profit margin and is equal to the product sales price minus all of the expenses the company 
incurred to produce its product that were not incurred due to the interruption. [d. 
40 [d. 
41 [d. 
42 [d. 
43 [d. 
44 [d. 
45 [d. This discount may be measured by "an analysis of comparable sales transactions, a study 
of illiquidity premiums for investors in unmarketable securities, as well as a review of studies 
of marketability discounts." [d. 
46 See infra notes 48-233 and accompanying text. 
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vague terminology which permitted the Supreme Judicial Court to 
interpret the statute so as to deny the recovery of economic losses.47 
Before examining the Massachusetts courts' treatment of this issue, 
however, it is helpful to examine how the common law and statutory 
schemes have treated the recovery of purely economic losses. 
III. TREATMENT OF ECONOMIC LOSSES UNDER COMMON LAW 
AND STATUTORY SCHEMES 
A. Common Law Physical Injury Rule 
The common law has consistently provided that economic losses 
may not be recovered unless the plaintiff suffers an accompanying 
physical injury or property damage.48 This rule restricting recovery 
is often referred to as the physical injury rule and is almost univer-
sally applied in a variety of contexts.49 This rule is virtually a per se 
bar to the recovery of purely economic losses and finds its origin in 
two early cases.5O In Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, the 
United States Supreme Court held that plaintiffs who chartered a 
ship were prohibited from recovering their lost use and lost profits 
caused by the defendant's negligent repair of the ship's propeller.51 
The Court held that the individual who merely chartered, but did not 
own, the ship could not recover for his economic losses because he 
suffered no physical injury or property damage.52 The Court, however, 
held that the ship's owner was entitled to sue for economic losses 
47 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 5 (1992); Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 613 N.E.2d 92, 
94-95 (Mass. 1993). 
48 See Barber Lines AJS v. MIV Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 1985); Just's Inc. v. 
Arlington Constr. Co., 583 P.2d 997, 1005 (Idaho 1978); Stop & Shop Companies, Inc. v. Fisher, 
444 N.E.2d 368, 371 (Mass. 1983); People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail, 495 A.2d 107, 
109 (N.J. 1985); see also Byrd v. English, 43 S.E. 419, 420-21 (Ga. 1903) (printing plant owner 
prohibited from recovering lost profits when defendant negligently interrupted power being 
supplied to plant); Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200, 201, 203-04 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1946) (plaintiff employee prevented from recovering lost wages after unable to work due to fire 
negligently caused by defendant's damage to stored liquified natural gas); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 766C (1977) (plaintiff may not recover for purely economic losses without 
accompanying physical harm); Fleming James, Jr., Limitatirms on Liability for Economic Loss 
Caused by Negligence: A Pragmatic Appraisal, 25 VAND. L. REV. 43, 43 (1972). 
49 Mulhern, supra note 23, at 87 n.15. 
50 People Express, 495 A.2d at 109. This rule is based on Robbins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. 
Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927), and Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co., 10 Q.B. 453 (1875). Yet neither 
of these two cases explicitly forbids the recovery of purely economic losses. People Express, 
495 A.2d at 109. 
51 Robbins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. at 308--09. 
52 See id. at 308. 
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caused by the negligent damage to the ship because he had suffered 
damage to his property.53 Similarly, in Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks 
Co., the Queen's Bench Court held that the plaintiff could not recover 
for economic losses when the defendant's negligence prevented the 
plaintiff from performing a contract to repair a road. 54 The defendant 
company negligently maintained a water pipe under a roadway. 55 The 
plaintiff, hired to build a tunnel under the road, began work that was 
obstructed by a leak in the defendant's water pipe.56 The plaintiff 
finished the tunnel but incurred economic losses in the process.57 The 
court denied any recovery for these losses due to the lack of physical 
injury or property damage suffered by the plaintiff.58 
Over the years, the courts have cited various reasons for the physi-
cal injury rule. The most critical basis for the rule is the protection 
from unlimited liability of defendants who cause extensive damages.53 
Other justifications for the rule expressed by courts are the preven-
tion of fraudulent claims and mass litigation.60 Lastly, the courts have 
expressed a concern that liability be measured and imposed according 
to the proportion of the defendant's fault.61 To address these concerns, 
courts have applied the physical injury rule because the requirement 
of physical injury or property damage limits the number of plaintiffs 
who can sue, legitimizes their claims, and allows for proportional 
liability.62 
The Massachusetts courts have applied the physical injury rule to 
allow for the recovery of economic losses when they are accompanied 
by physical injury or property damage.63 For example, in Newlin v. 
New England Telephone & Telegraph Co., the Massachusetts Su-
63 See id. "The injury to the propeller was no wrong to the respondents [charterers] but only 
to those to whom it belonged." [d. 
64 Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Co., 10 Q.B. 453 (1875), cited in Hnatt, supra note 21, at 
1188. 
55 Cattle, 10 Q.B. at 455--56 (1875), cited in Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1188. 
ss [d. 
57 [d. 
58 [d. 
59 People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail, 495 A.2d 107, 110 (N.J. 1985); see Hnatt, supra 
note 21, at 1190. 
00 Peaple Express, 495 A.2d at 110; J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 65 (Cal. 1979); 
Stevenson v. East Ohio Gas Co., 73 N.E.2d 200, 203 (Ohio Ct. App. 1946); Kinsman Transit Co. 
v. City of Buffalo, 388 F.2d 821, 823 (2d Cir. 1968); Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1191. 
61 Peaple Express, 495 A.2d at 110; Barber Lines AlS v. MN Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 55 (1st 
Cir. 1985); Kinsman Transit, 388 F.2d at 823; Mulhern, supra note 23, at 91; Hnatt, supra note 
21, at 1193. 
62 See Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1183. 
63 See infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text. 
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preme Judicial Court applied the physical injury rule to allow the 
plaintiffs to recover for their economic 10sses.64 In Newlin, a telephone 
pole, negligently maintained by the defendant, fell onto a power line 
and disabled electrical equipment used by the plaintiff to grow mush-
rooms.65 The mushrooms overheated and the crop was destroyed.66 
The court awarded the plaintiff recovery for economic losses because 
there was an accompanying physical injury to the mushroom crop.67 
Then too, relying on Newlin, the Supreme Judicial Court awarded 
economic losses in Kilduffv. Plymouth County Electric Co., when the 
plaintiff's house was destroyed by an electrical fire started when an 
electrical wire slipped from the defendant's hands onto the plaintiff's 
home.68 Given the occurrence of property damage, the plaintiff 
was able to recover for his economic 10sses.69 Similarly, in Morani v. 
Agatha Fisheries, Inc., the Federal District Court of Massachusetts 
relied on Newlin to award economic losses to a worker who sustained 
severe injuries after falling eight feet to the ground due to carbon 
monoxide exposure.70 The district court provided for the recovery of 
economic losses as they were accompanied by physical injury.71 
The Massachusetts courts also have applied the physical injury rule 
to deny recovery for economic losses when they are unaccompanied 
by physical injury or property damage.72 For instance, in McDonough 
v. Whalen, the plaintiff's property decreased in value after the defen-
dants defectively designed and installed a septic system in the plain-
tiff's home.73 The appeals court held that, "[i]n the absence of personal 
injury or physical damage to property, the negligent supplier of de-
fective products is not ordinarily liable in tort to a purchaser for 
simple pecuniary loss caused by defective or inferior merchandise."74 
Then too, in Marcil v. John Deere Industrial Equipment Co., the 
64 54 N.E.2d 929, 931 (Mass. 1944). 
66 [d. at 930. 
66 [d. 
67 See id. at 931; Stop & Shop Companies, Inc. v. Fisher, 444 N.E.2d 368, 371 (Mass. 1983). 
68 See 203 N.E.2d 679, 680-81 (Mass. 1965). 
69 See id.; Stap & Shap, 444 N.E.2d at 371. 
70 See 213 F. Supp. 257, 258, 259-60 (D. Mass. 1963). The court awarded the plaintiff damages 
for his diminution of earning capacity. [d. at 260. 
71 See id. 
72 See infra notes 73-83 and accompanying text. 
73 304 N .E.2d 199, 201 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 313 N.E.2d 435 (Mass. 
1974). 
74 [d. (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court later reversed this decision, but did not hold 
that the rule applied by the appeals court was incorrect. McDonough v. Whalen, 313 N.E.2d 435, 
438 (Mass. 1974). It merely found that the plaintiffs had in fact experienced physical property 
damage to their land. [d. at 440. 
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Massachusetts Appeals Court held that a negligent defendant's mere 
infliction of severe economic harm did not warrant the recovery of 
those business losses.75 In Marcil, the plaintiff purchased a vehicle 
from the defendant to aid in his excavation business.76 The plaintiff 
experienced difficulty with the vehicle due to the defendant's negli-
gent manufacture of the product.77 Relying on McDonough v. Whalen, 
the court denied recovery for the mere "pecuniary losses" because 
they were unattended by physical injury or property damage.78 
Lastly, in Stop & Shop Companies, Inc. v. Fisher, the plaintiff sought 
damages for loss of business revenues from its supermarket and 
department stores after the defendant's barge negligently collided 
into a drawbridge.79 The damaged bridge denied customers access to 
the plaintiffs stores on the other side of the bridge for two months.so 
While the court did not foreclose the possibility of economic loss 
recovery under a nuisance theory, the court refused to allow for the 
recovery of these losses under a negligence analysis.81 The court rea-
soned that the plaintiffs losses were not the result of any physical 
damage to its property.82 Rather, the court stated that "[i]n negligence 
cases, recovery has wisely been confined to physical damage to the 
plaintiff's property."83 
Over time, however, the physical injury rule has exhibited various 
shortcomings which have influenced many courts to reevaluate the 
rule's effectiveness in reaching its purported goals. Commentators 
and courts argue that the physical injury rule arbitrarily, randomly, 
and crudely distinguishes recoverable economic losses from non-re-
coverable harm by the fortuitous occurrence of physical injury or 
property damage.84 The rule thus allows those who sustain economic 
losses accompanied by physical injury or property damage to recover, 
while it prevents those who suffer only economic losses from receiving 
a remedy.85 In fact, plaintiffs who experience physical injury or prop-
75 403 N.E.2d 430, 434 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980). 
76Id. at 431...,'l2 
77 I d. at 432. 
78 Id. at 434. 
79 Stop & Shop Companies, Inc. v. Fisher, 444 N.E.2d 368, 369 (Mass. 1983). 
80 Id. at 370. 
81Id. at 371-72. 
82 See id. at 371. 
83 Id. at 374. 
84 Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1195. 
85 P.S. Atiyah, Negligence and Economic Loss, 88 L. Q. REV. 248, 252 (1967). In fact, a 
business' injury may often lead to more significant losses than physical injury or property 
damage. J' Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 64 (Cal. 1979). 
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erty damage may recover for their economic losses even when such 
economic losses far exceed their physical injury or property damage.86 
Some courts have described this result as "capriciously shower[ing] 
compensation along the path of physical destruction."87 Others argue 
that such a result is especially outrageous when one considers that 
"property is merely one form of financial loss, and is perfectly capable 
of being remedied by an award of damages in money."88 As one author 
described, such an arbitrary and harsh distinction between recover-
able economic losses and non-recoverable harm is both "crude and 
unreliable."89 
In addition, some commentators and courts argue that strict adher-
ence to the physical injury rule impedes the purpose of tort law-
"that wronged persons should be compensated for their injuries and 
that those responsible for the wrong should bear the cost of their 
tortious conduct."9o By striving to achieve this purpose by allowing 
for the recovery of purely economic losses, courts would discourage 
similar tortious behavior, foster safer products, vindicate safety con-
scious conduct, and ultimately shift "the risk of loss and associated 
costs of dangerous activities to those who should be and are best able 
to bear them."91 
B. Exceptions to Physical Injury Rule 
To avoid these inherent problems with the per se physical injury 
rule, and to address the concerns which led to its imposition, many 
courts are employing a variety of alternative theories to allow for the 
recovery of purely economic 10sses.92 Courts have adopted these theo-
ries because the risks of unlimited liability, mass litigation, fraudulent 
claims, and disproportionate liability support only a limitation to the 
recovery of economic losses rather than a complete bar.93 Thus, the 
courts in many instances have bypassed the strict physical injury rule 
and allowed for the recovery of purely economic 10sses.94 Recovery 
under these theories, however, is not unbounded. Rather, these alter-
nate methods impose more liberal and flexible limits on the recovery 
86 Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1195. 
87 People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail, 495 A.2d 107, 111 (N.J. 1985). 
88 Atiyah, supra note 85, at 269-70. 
89 Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1196. 
90 People Express, 495 A.2d at 11I. 
91 [d. 
92 [d.; see infra notes 100-76. 
93 People Express, 495 A.2d at 110. 
94 See infra notes 100-76 and accompanying text. 
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of economic losses than the per se bar to recovery under the physical 
injury rule.95 When courts have engaged these liberalized limitations, 
there is no indication that unfair recovery has resulted.96 
Thus, two lines of cases have emerged. Many courts adhere to the 
use of the physical injury rule and allow for the recovery of economic 
losses only when accompanied by physical injury or property dam-
age.97 Other courts, however, have found the physical injury rule too 
inflexible and thus, have employed more liberal and flexible means to 
determine when plaintiffs may recover for economic 10sses.98 Under 
these theories, some courts have held that economic losses may be 
recovered even when they are unaccompanied by physical injury or 
property damage.99 
1. Special Relationship 
One approach utilized by courts to impose a more liberal limit on 
the recovery of purely economic losses is to allow for the recovery of 
these losses when a "special relationship" exists between the plaintiff 
who has suffered economic loss and the negligent tortfeasorYXl The 
cases adopting this approach often involve the tort of negligent mis-
representation in which plaintiffs have been economically injured by 
the negligent performance of the defendant's services.1OI One court 
has stated that "[t]he special relationship, in reality, is an expression 
of the courts' satisfaction that a duty of care existed because the 
plaintiffs were particularly foreseeable and the injury was proxi-
mately caused by the defendant's negligence."102 The courts have 
found a special relationship to exist among a variety of persons, 
95 See infra notes 100-76 and accompanying text. Many courts have increasingly looked to 
considerations of public policy and fairness to avoid application of the physical injury rule. People 
Express, 495 A.2d at 110. Courts have also held that allowing a plaintiff to recover from an 
individual who has committed a wrongdoing is a more valid concern than that of protecting 
against threats of frivolous claims, mass litigation, and disproportionate liability. Id. The People 
Express court stated that " ... we have subordinated the threat of potential baseless claims to 
the right of an aggrieved individual to pursue a just and fair claim for redress attributable to 
the wrongdoing of another." Id. 
96 Id. 
97 See supra notes 48-83 and accompanying text. 
98 See infra notes 100-76 and accompanying text. 
99 See infra notes 100-76 and accompanying text. 
100 Peaple Express, 495 A.2d at 112; Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1196; Mulhern, supra note 23, at 
95. 
101 Peaple Express, 495 A.2d at 112. 
102Id. 
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including an attorney and client;103 an auditor and stock purchaser;104 
a surveyor and land purchaser;105 and an architect and contractor.106 
2. Duty, Foreseeability, and Proximate Cause 
Another approach adopted by many courts to place a more liberal 
limit on the recovery of economic losses is the application of the 
theories of duty, foreseeability, and proximate cause.107 While courts 
have applied these theories to preclude the recovery of economic 
losses,108 they have also employed them to allow plaintiffs to recover 
purely economic losses, a result completely prevented by the applica-
100 See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). 
1M See Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 140, 155 (N.J. 1983). 
105 See Rozny v. Marnul, 250 N.E.2d 656, 663 (Ill. 1969). 
106 See United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132, 135 (S.D. Cal. 1958). 
10'7 People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail, 495 A.2d 107, 110-12 (N.J. 1985); Palsgraf v. 
Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y.), reh'g denied, 164 N.E. 564 (N.Y. 1928); J' Aire Corp. 
v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 64 (Cal. 1979). " ... [pjrinciples of duty and proximate cause are 
instrumental in limiting the amount of litigation and extent of liability in cases in which no 
physical harm occurs just as they are in cases involving physical injury." People Express, 495 
A.2d at 110. The majority of courts impose on all people a general "duty to exercise the care of 
a reasonable and prudent person under the same or similar circumstances." DAN B. DOBBS, 
TORTS AND COMPENSATION, PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
INJURY 97 (1985). When a person's conduct lacks this reasonable care, that person is in breach 
of this duty and may be liable. ld. The doctrine of proximate cause is also applied by courts in 
an effort to limit defendants' liability for all consequences of their actions. People Express, 495 
A.2d at 110. 
The most well-known case establishing the use of the duty and proximate cause theories to 
limit liability is Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (1928), reh'g denied, 164 N.E. 564 
(1928). In that case, one of the defendant's employees knocked a package of fireworks from a 
passenger's hands while attempting to aid that passenger onto the train. Palsgmj, 162 N.E. at 
99. The falling package exploded and caused a scale located on the far end of the platform to fall 
onto and injure the plaintiff. ld. The New York Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's injuries 
were not compensable. ld. at 101. The court reasoned that while the defendant may have 
breached his duty toward the person he pushed onto the train, he did not have a duty to exercise 
reasonable care towards the plaintiff who was standing many feet away. ld. at 100-D1. The court 
reasoned that the defendant could not have foreseen the type of injury that occurred nor the 
plaintiff upon whom it was inflicted. ld. Rather, the defendant only had a duty to a plaintiff on 
whom his conduct imposed a foreseeable risk. ld. 
100 Courts have applied the theories of duty, foreseeability, and proximate cause to preclude 
liability for economic losses either because there was no duty owed to the plaintiff, Mandal v. 
Hoffman Constr. Co., 527 P.2d 387, 389 (Or. 1974), or because the defendant's actions were not 
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 41 A.2d 267, 270 (N.J. 
1945). In Rickards, the defendant's barge collided with a bridge that had enabled customers to 
frequent the plaintiff's retail stores. 41 A.2d at 268. The court denied recovery for economic 
losses because it found that an ordinary prudent person could not reasonably have foreseen that 
the plaintiff would incur this injury. ld. at 269-70. While the economic losses may have been 
somewhat foreseeable, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in another case, felt that the Rickards 
court's holding may be attributed to the defendant's lack of the requisite knowledge or particular 
foreseeability to allow for recovery. People Express, 495 A.2d at 117. 
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tion of the physical injury rule.109 For example, in People Express 
Airlines v. Consolidated Rail Corp., a chemical leak in a nearby 
freight yard instigated a fire which forced the plaintiff to evacuate its 
premises for approximately twelve hours in order to avoid the effects 
of a potential explosion. no The New Jersey Supreme Court held that 
purely economic losses suffered as a result of the evacuation may be 
recovered despite the lack of accompanying physical injury or prop-
erty damage. 111 
The People Express court, however, limited its holding by requiring 
that certain conditions be met before such liability may be imposed.l12 
The court first required that the defendant know or be able to par-
ticularly foresee that a certain class of plaintiffs would be harmed.ll3 
To meet this requirement, the defendant must be able to particularly 
foresee the type of individuals or entities comprising the class, the 
probability of their presence at the scene of the release, and the 
approximate number of plaintiffs in the classy4 Secondly, in order to 
recover, the court required that the defendant's actions be the proxi-
mate cause of a particularly foreseeable injury to the plaintiff's eco-
nomic interests.115 The court found that the railway had knowledge of 
the dangerous nature of the chemicals it was dealing with and should 
have been able to foresee the risk of harm that its conduct would 
cause the plaintiffsy6 This knowledge, as one commentator noted, 
instilled a duty on the defendant to act with reasonable care to avoid 
causing economic harm to those it should have known would suffer 
from its actions.ll7 Thus, the court held that the plaintiff knew or 
should have foreseen both the particular type of harm that its activi-
ties would impose, and the particular identifiable class of plaintiff on 
which such harm would be inflicted, and thus, may be held liable for 
the economic losses suffered by the defendants.1l8 
Similarly, the California Supreme Court held that purely economic 
losses may be recovered in a negligence action despite the lack of 
accompanying physical injury or property damage.1l9 In J'Aire Corp. 
109 Peaple Express, 495 A.2d at 118; J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 589 P.2d 60, 64 (Cal. 1979). 
110 Peaple Express, 495 A.2d at 118. 
111 [d. 
112 [d. at 116--18. 
113 [d. at 116. 
114 [d. 
115 [d.; Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1204. 
116 Peaple Express, 495 A.2d at 118; Mulhern, supra note 23, at 101. 
117 Mulhern, supra note 23, at 101. 
118 Peaple Express, 495 A.2d at 118. 
119 J' Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 64 (1979). 
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v. Gregory, a corporate restaurant operator rented its premises from 
the county government.120 The terms of the lease provided that the 
county would renovate the heating and air conditioning systems in 
the building.121 The defendant, however, did not perform the work 
within a reasonable time period and thereby delayed the plaintiff's 
operation of his restaurant and caused the loss of business profits.122 
The court allowed the plaintiff to recover for these purely economic 
losses despite the lack of physical injury incurred.123 The court relied 
on the existence of a relationship between the parties such that the 
defendant had a duty to perform the renovations so as to abstain from 
causing unnecessary injury to the plaintiffs restaurant.124 In arriving 
at this holding, the court reasoned that the defendant's failure to 
complete the renovations within a reasonable time would foreseeably 
interrupt the plaintiff's business.125 
In addition, courts have used the notions of duty and foreseeability 
to allow for the recovery of economic losses in a pollution contamina-
tion context.126 In Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, the defendant oil company 
released enormous quantities of crude oil into the Santa Barbara 
Channel causing lost profits for commercial fisherman who made their 
living by the Channel.127 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held that the defendant had a duty to use due care in its business with 
respect to the plaintiffs.128 The court also found that the defendant 
oil company reasonably could have foreseen both the plaintiffs that 
would suffer from the company's activities, as well as the resultant 
injury that they would incur.129 
3. Direct Versus Indirect Injury 
Another approach utilized by the courts to obviate the rigid physi-
cal injury rule in the pollution contamination context is to distinguish 
between direct and indirect injury suffered as a result of a defendant's 
negligent conduct. In Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., the United 
100 J'Aire Carp., 598 P.2d at 62. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
128 Id. at 64. ''Where the risk of harm is foreseeable, as it was in the present case, an injury 
to the plaintiff's economic interests should not go uncompensated merely because it was unac-
companied by an injury to his person or property." Id. 
124 Id. at 63--U4. 
125 Id. at 63. 
100 Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 570 (9th Cir. 1974). 
127 Id. at 559. 
128 Id. at 570. 
129 Id. at 569. 
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia allowed for 
the recovery of economic losses despite the lack of accompanying 
physical injury or property damage.13o In Allied, the Allied Chemical 
Corporation disposed of a highly toxic pesticide, Kepone, into the 
Chesapeake Bay.13l Allied's disposal of Kepone into the Bay adversely 
impacted several categories of individuals, including: commercial 
fisherman; marina owners; boat, tackle, and bait shops; and seafood 
wholesalers, retailers, processors, distributors, and restauranteurs.l32 
The court ultimately determined which plaintiffs were entitled to 
recover based on the directness of their relationship to the Bay.l33 
Although the plaintiffs did not suffer any property damage, each 
incurred substantial economic losses that were not recoverable under 
the physical injury rule.l34 The court held, however, that the destruc-
tion of the Bay should not go uncompensated and that a denial of 
liability would not serve social utility because many direct and indi-
rect users benefit from the Bay.135 The court examined the relationship 
of the parties to the Bay and held that, while none of the plaintiffs 
claimed property rights to the Bay's wildlife, commercial fishermen 
were direct users of the Bay.l36 The fishermen's status as direct users 
arose out of what the court determined to be a constructive property 
interest in the Bay's harvestable species.137 The fishermen were, thus, 
entitled to compensation for their loss of profits incurred.l38 
130 523 F. Supp. 975, 980 (E.D. Va. 1981). 
131Id. at 976. 
132Id. at 976 n.1. 
133 I d. at 980. 
134Id. at 976 & n.3. Under the physical injury rule, a plaintiff may not recover for economic 
losses unless they are accompanied by physical injury or property damage. See supra notes 
48--83 and accompanying text. 
135 Allied, 523 F. Supp. at 978. 
136 See id. at 978. 
137Id. 
138Id. at 979. The fishermen were held to satisfy the test established by Union Oil Co. v. 
Oppen, that they "lawfully and directly make use of a resource of the sea." Allied, 523 F. Supp. 
at 979 & n.16. The court also sought to distinguish between plaintiffs who suffered recoverable 
injuries and those that did not, by determining whether holding the defendant liable would 
consist of double-counting damages. Id. at 979. For example, the seafood harvested by commer-
cial fishermen is likely to be bought and sold many times before ultimately being sold for 
consumption. Id. The court did not, however, allow the seafood distributors and retailers to 
recover from the defendant. See id. In the interests of equity and social utility, the court held 
that the defendant should not be forced to pay repeatedly for the same damage. Id. Since the 
commercial fishing interests were satisfied by allowing the fisherman themselves to recover, the 
court held that plaintiffs who purchased and marked seafood from commercial fisherman-sea-
food wholesalers, retailers, processors, distributors, and restaurateurs-suffered damages too 
indirect to be "legally cognizable" because allowing their claims would result in double counting. 
I d. at 979--80. 
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The Allied court adopted a similar approach to compensate boat, 
tackle and bait shops, as well as marina owners, for their losses.139 
Unlike commercial fishermen, the court determined that the interests 
of sport fishermen would unlikely be served by allowing sport fisher-
men to recover for their economic losses because few would likely 
seek legal redress due to the minimal nature of their losses.14o To 
ensure equity, the court allowed a set of "surrogate plaintiffs" -boat, 
tackle and bait shops and marina owners-to recover for their eco-
nomic losses from the ecological damage to the Bay.141 These plaintiffs 
were held to be direct users of the Bay because of their location on 
the water's edge.l42 The court admitted, however, that its means of 
distinguishing between the various plaintiffs' claims were not based 
on clearly reasoned analysis, but rather on equity and efficiency con-
cerns and a desire to limit the seemingly endless number of potential 
plaintiffs.l43 Given these concerns, the nature of the court's analysis 
was arbitrary, as reflected by the court's own statement that it found 
itself with a "perceived need to limit liability, without any articulable 
reason for excluding any particular set of plaintiffs."144 
4. Special Injury 
As in negligence cases, courts applying the common law of nuisance 
have also struggled to balance the competing desires of plaintiffs, who 
seek recovery for their economic losses, and defendants, who strive 
to limit their liability for unforeseeable consequences. The Massachu-
setts courts have achieved this balance by allowing for the recovery 
of purely economic losses in public nuisance cases when the plaintiff 
has suffered a "special injury."l45 A public nuisance occurs through an 
interference with the exercise of a public right either through affect-
ing public property directly, or causing a "common injury."l46 In order 
for an individual plaintiff to bring a public nuisance claim, the plaintiff 
must prove that the public nuisance caused him or her to suffer a 
direct and substantial "special injury," different in kind and degree 
than that suffered by the general public.147 When such a special injury 
139 See id. at 980. 
140 Id. 
141Id. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 979-80. 
144 Id. at 980. 
146 Connerty v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 495 N.E.2d 840, 845 (Mass. 1986). 
146 Id. 
147Id. at 845; Stop & Shop Companies, Inc. v. Fisher, 444 N.E.2d 368, 373 (Mass. 1983); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 821C cmt. h (1977). 
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is suffered, "a private plaintiff may recover for injuries caused by a 
public nuisance even though the injury did not involve any interfer-
ence with the use of land in which the plaintiff had a property inter-
est."148 
In Stop & Shop Companies, Inc. v. Fisher, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court held that pecuniary harm caused by the obstruc-
tion of a public way was a special injury that may warrant the recov-
ery of economic losses.149 In Stop & Shop, the defendant's seagoing 
vessel negligently collided with a drawbridge, thereby closing the 
bridge to traffic for two months.150 During the time the bridge was 
closed, the plaintiff experienced a substantial decline in the number 
of patrons that frequented its stores and, as a result, suffered eco-
nomic harm in the form of lost business revenues. l5l The Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court held that the negligent collision of the 
vessel with the bridge caused an obstruction of a public way and, 
therefore, created a public nuisance.152 
The court, however, held that a finding of public nuisance does not 
automatically lead to the recovery of economic losses by the plain-
tiff.153 Such losses may only be recovered when the plaintiff experi-
enced a special harm that is different not only in degree, but in kind, 
from the type of harm suffered by the general public.154 Thus, while 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court refrained from evaluating 
Stop & Shop's public nuisance claim on the merits, it held that a 
plaintiff may recover for purely economic harm, absent physical in-
jury or direct loss of access to property, when the plaintiff has in-
curred special pecuniary harm from a substantial impairment of ac-
cess that is both different in kind and degree from that suffered by 
the general public.155 
Then too, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Connerty 
v. Metropolitan District Commission, held that substantial harm to 
the plaintiff's livelihood was sufficient to constitute a special injury 
148 Connerty, 495 N.E.2d at 845. 
149 Stop & Slwp, 444 N.E.2d at 372-73; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 821C 
cmt. h (1977). Other courts have also imposed liability for economic losses under a public 
nuisance theory absent physical injury or property damage when the "pecuniary losses suffered 
by those who make direct use of [a] resource are particularly foreseeable because they are so 
closely linked to the defendant's behavior." People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail, 495 
A.2d 107, 114 (N.J. 1985). 
160 Stop & Shop, 444 N.E.2d at 369--70. 
151Id. 
152 Id. at 371. 
153 Id. at 373. 
164 Id. 
155 Id. at 374. 
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not suffered by the general public so as to allow for the recovery of 
economic losses under a public nuisance theory.156 In Connerty, the 
Metropolitan District Commission discharged raw sewage into a bay 
where the plaintiff, a licensed clam digger, engaged in the business of 
harvesting and selling clams.157 The discharge of sewage resulted in 
the closure of the bay to shellfish harvesting and prevented the plain-
tiff from harvesting or selling clams.158 The plaintiff suffered lost 
profits due to this decrease in sales and was allowed to recover for 
these losses from the defendant. 159 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, thus, has allowed for 
the recovery of purely economic losses arising out of public nui-
sances.160 The court, however, requires a special injury, different in 
kind and degree than that suffered by the general public.161 Pecuniary 
harm, including harm to one's livelihood, or accompanied by a substan-
tial impairment of access, meets this requirementYiZ By requiring that 
a special injury occur before economic losses may be recovered, the 
court is able to award recovery for economic losses while still limiting 
a defendant's liability.163 
5. Strict Liability 
In the area of tort-based strict liability,164 the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court has denied recovery for economic losses when 
156 495 N.E.2d 840, 845 (Mass. 1986). 
157 [d. at 841. 
158 [d. 
159 [d. 
160 See supra notes 145-59 and accompanying text. 
161 Stop & Shop Companies, Inc. v. Fisher, 444 N.E.2d 368, 373 (Mass. 1983). 
162 [d. at 374; Connerty, 495 N.E.2d at 845. 
163 See Stop & Shop, 444 N.E.2d at 373. 
164 Under a strict liability theory, liability is imposed without regard to fault or negligence. 
Clark-Aiken Co. v. Cromwell Wright Co., 323 N.E.2d 876, 885 (Mass. 1975). Strict liability is 
based on the theory that those who undertake to engage in certain activities must pay for any 
damage that the activity causes, even if the activity was conducted with the utmost care. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519(1) (1976). To be held strictly liable under the common 
law, a defendant must have engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity that caused personal 
injury or property damage, and the damage must have been a consequence of the risk created 
by the defendant's activity. Clark-Aiken, 323 N .E.2d at 886; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS 
§ 519 cmt. e (1976). 
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following factors are 
to be considered: (a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, 
land or chattel of others; (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; 
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which 
the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to 
the place where it is carried on; and (f) extent to which its value to the community is 
outweighed by its dangerous attributes. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1976). 
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the losses are not accompanied by physical injury or property dam-
age.l65 This view, however, has been reexamined and overruled in 
other states which have sought to eradicate the unfairness of this rule 
in the strict liability context.l66 
While there is currently a divergence of views, some courts allow 
for the recovery of purely economic losses under a strict liability 
theory.l67 The leading case reaching this result is Santor v. A & M 
Karagheusian, IncY"" In Santor, the plaintiff purchased a defective 
carpet manufactured by the defendant.l69 The plaintiff then sued the. 
defendant manufacturer under a theory of breach of an implied war-
ranty of merchantability.170 The New Jersey Supreme Court noted, 
however, that the liability of the manufacturer could also have been 
based on strict liability in tort.l7l The court reasoned that when a 
manufacturer such as the defendant places his products in the market 
for sale, he represents that they are safe and suitable for use.l72 Thus, 
the manufacturer has a duty independent from the intricacies of the 
law of sales.l73 The court concluded that although the recovery of 
purely economic losses has been applied only when users of products 
sustained physical injuries, the manufacturer's responsibility should 
be the same when no such physical injury has occurred.174 While this 
is apparently the "minority view,"175 other courts have also allowed 
for the recovery of purely economic losses under a strict liability 
theory.176 
165 Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 613 N.E.2d 92, 93 (Mass. 1993); Bay State-Spray & 
Provincetown Steamship, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 533 N.E.2d 1350, 1353 (Mass. 1989). 
166 Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 312-14 (N.J. 1965); Christopher C. 
Fallon, Jr., Physical Injury and Econamic Loss-The Fine Line of Distinction Made Clearer, 
27 VILL. L. REV. 483, 488 (1981-82). 
167 New Jersey allowed for the recovery of purely economic losses under a strict liability tort 
concept when the plaintiff bought a carpet manufactured by the defendant which turned out to 
be defective. Santor, 207 A.2d at 307, 312-14. The Supreme Court of California, however, held 
.that purely economic losses may not be recovered under a theory of strict liability in tort when 
the plaintiff purchased a truck manufactured by the defendant that overturned due to a defect 
in the brakes. Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 150--51 (Cal. 1965). 
168 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965). 
169Id. at 306. 
17°Id. at 307. 
171 Id. at 311. 
172Id. 
173Id. at 311-12. 
174Id. at 312. 
175 Kurt M. Rupert, Torts: Recavery of Damages for Economic Loss Through the Use of Strict 
Liability in Tort, 38 OKL. L. REV. 347, 350 (1985). 
176Id. at 350 & n.25; Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355, 366 (N.D. Ohio 
1979); Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co., 612 S.W.2d 321, 323, 324 (Ark. 1981); Verdon v. Transamerica 
Ins. Co., 446 A.2d 3, 8 (Conn. 1982); Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 182 N.W.2d BOO, B08--11 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1970); City of LaCrosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assoc., Inc., 240 N.W.2d 124, 
127 (Wis. 1976). 
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B. Statutory Schemes 
1. CERCLA 
CERCLA does not provide for the recovery of purely economic 
losses.l77 CERCLA was enacted as a response to the increasing prob-
lems of hazardous substance releases.178 The statute was primarily 
designed to "facilitate government cleanup of hazardous waste dis-
charge and impede future releases in order to prevent, minimize, or 
mitigate damage to the public health, welfare, and to the environ-
ment."l79 CERCLA was also enacted to provide funds to pay for 
pollution abatement costs at those sites that are the most severely 
contaminated with hazardous waste. lSO The statute creates a trust 
fund called the "Superfund," that is financed through excise taxes, and 
used to pay for clean-up programs.l8l CERCLA provides that federal 
and state governments, as well as private parties may recover for 
their incurred response costs as long as their response actions comply 
with the established guidelines of the Environmental Protection 
Agency's (EPA) National Contingency Plan.l82 In addition, each party 
engaging in a response action may sue those responsible for the 
generation, transportation or disposal of the hazardous wastes.l83 
The courts interpreting CERCLA have consistently held that 
purely economic losses are not recoverable under the statute's haz-
ardous waste liability scheme.l84 For example, one court held that 
177 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); Artesian Water Co. v. Governor of New 
Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1285-86 (D. Del. 1987), aff'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing 
S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a)(2)(A)-(G». 
178 Artesian Water, 659 F. Supp. at 1276; Dedham Water CO. V. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 
889 F.2d 1146, 1150 (1st Cir.), reh'g denied, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 18801 (1st Cir. 1989). 
179 Ambrogi V. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1237 (M.D. Pa. 1990). 
100 ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND 
SOCIETY 252 (1992). 
181 Exxon Corp. V. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 359 (1986); Artesian Water, 659 F. Supp. at 1277. The 
government may use money from the Superfund to "finance governmental response activities, 
to pay claims arising from the response activities of private parties, and to compensate federal 
or state governmental entities for damage caused to natural resources." Artesian Water, 659 F. 
Supp. at 1277; 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
182 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (1988 & Supp. III 1991); Artesian Water, 659 F. Supp. 
at 1278; Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1238. The National Contingency Plan is promulgated pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) and "establishes procedures, criteria, and responsi-
bilities for conducting response actions at Superfund sites." 42 U.S.C. § 9605. 
183 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988); Artesian Water, 659 F. Supp. at 1277. Response costs include 
both removal and short term cleanup as well as remedial measures. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(25) (1988); 
Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1240; Artesian Water, 659 F. Supp. at 1277. 
184 Cases interpreting CERCLA have held that the Superfund is not to be used to compensate 
private parties for their economic losses caused by the release of hazardous substances. Artesian 
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"Superfund money [is not] available to compensate private parties 
for economic harms that result from discharges of hazardous sub-
stances."185 Similarly, another court stated that, "Congress did not 
intend CERCLA to be utilized as a means to recover 'economic loss' 
for civil damages that a private party may seek as part of a toxic tort 
action."186 In Artesian Water Co. v. Governor of New Castle Caunty, 
the United States District Court for the District of Delaware stated 
that it is evident from the legislative history of CERCLA that the 
legislature specifically intended to deny recovery for economic losses 
resulting from the release of hazardous wastes.187 The original Senate 
bill, S. 1480, included a private cause of action for damages for eco-
nomic losses resulting from a discharge of hazardous substances.l88 
Yet, at the last minute, because of a political compromise, the Senate 
deleted this provision.189 The Artesian Water court held that this was 
clear evidence that Congress did not intend to provide for economic 
losses resulting from the release of hazardous wastes.1oo 
Water, 659 F. Supp. at 1286 (plaintiff's private claim for idling of property and equipment after 
pumping restrictions were imposed on its wells was a claim for economic loss and thus, not 
recoverable under CERCLA); Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1250 (the District Court for the District 
of Pennsylvania held plaintiffs loss of beneficial use of property was economic loss and, as such, 
not recoverable under CERCLA); Wehner v. Syntex Corp, 681 F. Supp. 651, 653 (N .D. Cal. 1987) 
(court held plaintiff's diminished value of property due to dioxin contamination was economic 
loss and thus, not recoverable as response cost under CERCLA); Piccolini v. Simon's Wrecking, 
686 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (plaintiff's claim for damages due to diminished property 
value and lost income are not recoverable under CERCLA); Exxon v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 335,359 
(1986) (private party claims for economic harms due to environmental contamination are not 
recoverable under CERCLA). 
185 Exxon, 475 U.S. at 359. 
186 Ambrogi, 750 F. Supp. at 1248. 
187 Artesian Water, 659 F. Supp. at 1285. 
188 [d. at 1285-86 (citing S. 1480, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4(a)(2)(A)-(G)). The original Senate 
bill created a private cause of action for: 
[d. 
all damages for economic loss or loss due to personal injury or loss of natural resources 
resulting from such a discharge, release, or disposal, including: (A) any injury to, 
destruction of, or loss of any real or personal property, including relocation costs; (B) 
any loss of use of real or personal property; (C) any injury to, destruction of, or loss of 
natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, 
or loss; (D) any loss of use of any natural resources, without regard to the ownership 
or management of such resources; (E) any loss of income or profits or impairment of 
earning capacity resulting from personal injury or from injury to or destruction of real 
or personal property or natural resources, without regard to the ownership of such 
property or resources; (F) all out-of-pocket medical expenses, including rehabilitation 
costs or burial expenses, due to personal injury; and (G) any direct or indirect loss of 
tax, royalty, rental, or net profits share revenue by the Federal Government or any 
State or political subdivision thereof, for a period of not to exceed one year. 
189 [d. at 1286. 
190 [d. at 1285-86. In Artesian, the plaintiff water company claimed $600,000 of response costs 
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Thus, while CERCLA was enacted to alleviate the problems of 
hazardous waste contamination, it does not live up to the all-inclusive 
scheme ofliability that it was originally proposed to effectuate.l9l This 
is because CERCLA was not enacted to regulate all aspects of haz-
ardous waste, nor is it capable of cleaning up all such contaminated 
sites.192 The purpose of CERCLA is somewhat restrictive in that it is 
not intended "to make injured parties whole or to create a general 
vehicle for toxic tort actions."193 Rather, CERCLA is designed to 
ensure that the Superfund is used in a "cost-effective and environ-
mentally sound manner."194 
Due to CERCLA's lack of a comprehensive regulatory structure, 
the statute envisions and encourages state participation in its clean-
up scheme.195 CERCLA not only requires state matching grants be-
fore providing funds for federal clean-up projects, but also allows for 
federal reimbursement to states that use their own authority to re-
spond to releasesY16 CERCLA allows states to conduct federal re-
sponse actions or to manage their own clean-up actions, provided they 
yield to "federal guidance or control."l97 After expending funds for 
clean-up actions, states may recoup these funds from responsible 
private parties or from the Superfund.198 
In keeping with CERCLA's vision of cooperative state and federal 
action to abate hazardous waste sites, CERCLA's three substantive 
programs each elicit state participation.199 The first substantive pro-
gram involves response actions.2°O This program instills both federal 
and state governments with the necessary authority to conduct clean-
when pwnping restrictions were imposed on its wells so as to prevent the company from using 
its equipment and property. [d. at 1287. 
191 Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348. The Superfund was decreased so that it could not possibly 
deal efficiently with the exorbitant cost of abating hazardous waste sites around the country. 
[d. In addition, the final version ofCERCLA lacks the originally proposed provisions that would 
provide compensation to third party victims and comprehensive liability for damages and waste 
cleanup. [d. 
192 Exxon v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 359 (1986). "The statute is not to be used, however, as a 
universal solution to all ills that originate from a hazardous waste site .... "; Warren, supra note 
14, at 10,348. 
100 Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1238 (M.D. Pa. 1990). 
194 [d. Thus, private plaintiffs may recover only for recovery actions that were "necessary 
costs of response ... consistent with the National Contingency Plan." [d. at 1238--39 (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988». 
196 Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348. 
196 [d. 
UII [d. 
198 [d. 
199 [d. 
200 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988). 
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up efforts on sites contaminated with hazardous waste.20l In addition, 
it requires the EPA, in conjunction with the states, to construct 
a National Contingency Plan.202 The response actions described by 
CERCLA not only permit, but mandate state participation.2oo 
CERCLA requires "state-federal consultation, makes state action 
and financial contribution a prerequisite to some federal response 
actions, and allows states to use federal response authority if they will 
satisfy all the conditions for federal action."204 
CERCL.Ns second substantive program involving state participa-
tion addresses who may be liable for response costs and damages, as 
well as the scope and apportionment of their liability.205 CERCLA 
defines responsible parties as owners or operators of hazardous sub-
stance dumps that are releasing waste, and generators and trans-
porters of waste to a problem site.206 While states may be responsible 
parties under this program,207 any necessary response costs incurred 
by the states during response actions taken consistent with the N a-
tional Contingency Plan are compensable by those responsible for the 
release.208 In addition, responsible parties are liable for response costs, 
as well as natural resource damages.209 
The final substantive program is the Superfund created by CER-
CLA to provide funds for federal response actions, as well as other 
actions taken by those, including states, who engage in proper re-
sponse measures.210 To receive funds, however, states must satisfac-
torily act within the EP.Ns National Contingency Plan21L-a plan 
which designs procedures, criteria, and responsibilities to be followed 
by a party conducting response actions at a Superfund site.212 
While CERCLA envisions cooperative state and federal implemen-
tation of environmental cleanup, it has also given states the flexibility 
201 42 U.S.C. § 9604; Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348. 
202 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988 & Supp. 1111991); Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348; see supra note 
182. 
203 42 U.S.C. § 9605; Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348. 
204 Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348; 42 U.S.C. § 9604. 
205 42 U.S.C § 9607 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348. 
206 42 U .S.C. § 9607(a) (1988); Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348. 
207 42 U.S.C. § 9607 making persons liable and 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1988) defining "person" 
to include states. Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348. 
208 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1988); Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348. 
209 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348. 
210 "Superfund" stands for the "Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund" created by 
CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1988); Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348. 
21142 U.S.C. § 9611(a)(2) (1988); Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348. 
21242 U.S.C. § 9605 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F. Supp. 1233, 1238 
(M.D. Pa. 1990). 
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to design and adopt their own hazardous waste legislation.213 In fact, 
"CERCLA appears to leave the states opportunities to fashion Su-
perfund programs either similar to or different from the federal 
scheme."214 CERCLA is a narrowly devised statute that is not meant 
to make the injured parties whole, and until Congress seeks to do so, 
"full compensation for hazardous waste harms will in most instances 
remain the province of state law."215 Thus, an inquiry into state haz-
ardous waste statutes is necessary to understand the overall hazard-
ous waste clean-up scheme. 
2. State Statutes 
Although CERCLA does not allow for the recovery of economic 
losses, it opens the door for states to provide for the recovery of these 
losses.216 In fact many state Superfund statutes differ from CERCLA 
in this respect and are, thereby, "leading the way in developing new 
approaches to the hazardous waste clean-up problem."217 Given CER-
CLA's limited scope, the statute encourages state and federal coop-
eration in implementing its provisions and provides states with wide 
discretion in developing their own pollution abatement statutes.218 
While some states' statutes parallel CERCLA, others exceed the 
scope of CERCLA in several areas including the recovery of economic 
losses.219 The Minnesota Environmental Response Liability Act 
(MERLA) and the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act 
are two such statutes that provide for the recovery of economic losses 
from responsible parties, by those assessed with hazardous waste 
clean-up costs.220 
The Minnesota Superfund statute has one of the most intricate 
private damage liability structures of all state Superfund statutes.221 
MERLA explicitly provides for statutory liability not only for per-
213 Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348. CERCLA does not provide for comprehensive mandatory 
procedures for states to follow. Rather they are given broad discretion to shape their own 
legislation. [d. 
214 Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348. 
215 Artesian Water Co. v. Governor of New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1299-1300 (D. 
Del. 1987), a/I'd, 851 F.2d 643 (3d Cir. 1988). 
216 See Versatile Metals Inc. v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1582-83 (E.D. Pa. 1988); 
Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348. 
217 Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348. 
218 [d. 
219 MINN. STAT. § U5B.05 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g (West 1992). 
200 MINN. STAT. § U5B.05 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:1O-23.Ug (West 1992). 
221 Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348. 
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sonal injury, but for economic losses as well.222 Economic losses under 
MERLA include injury, loss of use, or loss of past or future profits 
due to injury to real or personal property.2z! Interpreting this statute, 
the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota in 
Norwest Financial Leasing v. Morgan Whitney, held that MERLA 
not only allows for the recovery of sustained economic losses but also 
for the recovery of future economic losses resulting from hazardous 
waste contamination.224 In Norwest Financial Leasing, the defendant 
sold property that was later determined to be contaminated.225 Nor-
west Financial was the assignee of a promissory note, mortgage, and 
rent and lease assignments on the sold property.226 The court held that 
N orwest Financial was entitled to recover for economic losses, in the 
form of diminution in the value of its collateral, from the seller of the 
contaminated property.227 
The New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (NJSCCA) 
also reaches beyond its federal counterpart by committing its statu-
torily created fund to compensate specified parties for "all direct and 
indirect damages."228 While the statute has many purposes, one of its 
222 [d. at 10,348; MINN. STAT. § 115B.05(1)(a)(3) (1987). 
223 MINN. STAT. § 115B.05(1)(a)(1)-{3) (1987). Section 115B.05 states that: 
[d. 
... any person who is responsible for the release of a hazardous substance from a 
facility is strictly liable for the following damages which result from the release or to 
which the release significantly contributes: (a) all damages for actual economic loss 
including: (1) any injury to, destruction of, or loss of any real or personal property, 
including relocation costs; (2) any loss of use of real or personal property; (3) any loss 
of past or future income or profits resulting from injury to, destruction of, or loss of 
real or personal property without regard to the ownership of the property. 
224 787 F. Supp. 895, 902 (D. Minn. 1992); MINN. STAT. § 115B.05(1)(a)(3) (1987). 
225 Norwest Financial Leasing, 787 F. Supp. at 897. 
226 [d. 
227 [d. at 902-03. 
228 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:1O-23.11g(a) (West 1992). The compensation for third-party economic 
loss is very broad under the statute. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 358 n.1 (1986). The 
New Jersey statute creates a fund similar to the Superfund and provides that: 
[t]he fund shall be strictly liable, without regard to fault, for all cleanup and removal 
costs and for all direct and indirect damages no matter by whom sustained, including 
but not limited to: (1) the cost of restoring, repairing, or replacing any real or personal 
property damaged or destroyed by a discharge, any income lost from the time such 
property is damaged to the time such property is restored, repaired or replaced, and 
any reduction in value of such property caused by such discharge by comparison with 
its value prior thereto; (2) the cost of restoration and replacement, where possible, of 
any natural resource damaged or destroyed by a discharge; (3) the loss of income or 
impairment of earning capacity due to damage to real or personal property ... ; (4) loss 
of tax revenue by the State or local governments for a period of 1 year due to damage 
to real or personal property proximately resulting from a discharge; (5) interest on 
loans obtained or other obligations incurred by a claimant for the purpose of amelio-
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main goals is to compensate third parties for economic losses resulting 
from hazardous waste discharges.229 Section 11g(a)(3) of the NJSCCA 
allows one to sue the fund for "loss of income or impairment of earning 
capacity due to damage to real or personal property ... destroyed or 
damaged by a discharge .... "230 In City of Newark v. Block 183, the 
New Jersey Superior Court interpreted this statute to allow a tax-
payer to recover from the New Jersey Spill fund his loss of rental 
income due to a hazardous waste discharge.231 
New Jersey and Minnesota, thus, have taken the initiative provided 
by CERCLA to enact hazardous waste abatement statutes whose 
liability schemes reach beyond that of their federal counterpart.232 
These states have exercised their discretion to enact broader liability 
schemes by explicitly allowing for the recovery of economic losses 
caused by a release or discharge of hazardous waste.233 Thus, state 
statutes, as well as the common law, have rejected the physical injury 
rule and have provided for the recovery of purely economic losses in 
many circumstances. 
3. Chapter 21E 
In 1983 the Massachusetts Legislature enacted Massachusetts Gen-
eral Law chapter 21E, modeled after CERCLA.234 As chapter 21E is 
primarily based on CERCLA, many of the two statutes' provisions 
are similar.235 Despite these similarities, however, the two statutes are 
not identical.236 As opposed to CERCLA, chapter 21E contains more 
expansive coverage through its application to oil and hazardous waste 
releases, and it provides for a more comprehensive liability scheme 
through its allowance for the recovery of damages to real or personal 
property, as well as for response costS.237 
rating the adverse effects of a discharge pending the payment of a claim in full as 
provided by this act. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g (West 1992). 
229 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.110 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993); Exxon, 475 U.S. at 358. 
230 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g(a)(3) (West 1992). 
231 City of Newark v. Block, 537 A.2d 1311, 1313 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988). 
232 MINN. STAT. § 115B.05 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23.11g (West 1992). 
233 MINN. STAT. § 115B.05 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23.11g (West 1992). 
234 Griffith v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 585 N.E.2d 751, 753 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992), rev'd 
on other grounds, 610 N .E.2d 944 (Mass. 1993); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, 
889 F.2d 1146, 1156 (1st Cir.), reh'g denied, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS 18801 (1st Cir. 1989); Sheehy 
v. Lipton Indus., Inc., 507 N.E.2d 781, 786 (Mass. App. Ct.), review denied, 509 N.E.2d 1202 
(Mass. 1987); Breckenridge, supra note 15, at 19. 
235 Griffith v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 610 N.E.2d 944, 946 (Mass. 1993). 
236 Breckenridge, supra note 15, at 19. 
237 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 5(a)(I) (1992) (" ... the owner or operator of a vessel or a site 
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Chapter 21E was enacted to provide the Commonwealth with a 
means of promptly and effectively responding to oil and hazardous 
waste releases.238 It was also designed to ensure that the Common-
wealth could recover its costs from parties responsible for those re-
leases either because they own or owned the contaminated land or 
because they caused the release.239 In keeping with these purposes, 
chapter 21E provides for the investigation and cleanup of contami-
nated sites and imposes strict, joint and several liability on a variety 
of responsible parties.240 Chapter 21E also provides private parties 
with a means to bring suit against these responsible parties for the 
recovery of their response costs,241 as well as for property damage 
from or at which there is or has been a release or threat of release of oil .... "); § 5(a)(5) (" ... 
any person who otherwise caused or is legally responsible for a release or threat of release of 
oil .... "); § 5(a)(5)(iii) (" ... to any person for damage to his real or personal property .... "); 
see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14), (33) (1988) (excludes crude oil and petroleum from scope of 
CERCLA). Breckenridge, supra note 15, at 19 (CERCLA and 21E liability provisions differ in 
some respects). 
238 Acme Laundry Co. v. Secretary of Envtl. Affairs, 575 N.E.2d 1086, 1089 (Mass. 1991). 
239Id.; Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 613 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Mass. 1993) (citing Nassr v. 
Commonwealth, 477 N.E.2d 987, 991-92 (Mass. 1985) (quoting St. 1983, c. 7, emergency pream-
ble». "General Laws ch. 21E was enacted to clarify and improve the Commonwealth's capability 
for responding to releases of oil and hazardous material and to recover response costs from 
persons responsible for releases for which it has incurred such costs." Garweth, 613 N.E.2d at 
95. 
240 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, §§ 4, 5 (1992). Rosenblatt & Floyd, supra note 1, at 1507. Under 
chapter 21E, § 5, responsible parties include: 
(1) the owner or operator of a vessel or a site from or at which there is or has been a 
release or threat of release of oil or hazardous material; (2) any person who at the time 
of storage or disposal of any hazardous material owned or operated any site at or upon 
which such hazardous material was stored or disposed of and from which there is or 
has been a release or threat of release of hazardous material; (3) any person who by 
contract, agreement, or otherwise directly or indirectly, arranged for the transport, 
disposal, storage or treatment of hazardous material to or in a site or vessel from or 
at which there is or has been a release or threat of release of hazardous material; (4) 
any person who, directly or indirectly, transported any hazardous material to trans-
port, disposal, storage or treatment vessels or sites from or at which there is or has 
been a release or threat of release of such material; and (5) any person who otherwise 
caused or is legally responsible for a release or threat of release of oil or hazardous 
material from a vessel or site. 
ch. 21E, § 5. 
241 ch. 21E, § 4. Private parties may recover the reasonable costs of assessment, containment 
and removal actions. Id. Assessment costs refer to those expenses incurred in gathering infor-
mation to identify the existence, source, nature and extent of the hazardous waste or oil release, 
the extent of the danger to the public safety, and the parties responsible for the release. ch. 
21E, § 2. Containment expenses are the costs of actions taken to prevent or minimize hazardous 
material or oil releases so that they do not cause significant danger to the public health, safety, 
welfare or the environment. Id. Removal costs are incurred through cleanup of released oil or 
hazardous materials from the environment, the disposal of the removed oil and any other actions 
necessary to prevent, minimize or mitigate damage to public health, safety, welfare or the 
environment that may result from a release of hazardous substances. Id. 
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sustained because of a hazardous waste release.242 It is unclear, how-
ever, given the language of the statute, whether it provides for the 
recovery of purely economic losses.243 
a. Recoverable Losses Under Chapter 21E 
It is important to determine whether businesses may recover for 
their economic losses under chapter 21E because the statute imposes 
strict liability on those responsible for hazardous waste or oil re-
leases.244 Thus, any party that is a current or former owner or operator 
of a contaminated site, or who arranged for the transport, disposal, 
storage or treatment of hazardous materials, or who otherwise caused 
a release, is held strictly, jointly and severally liable for the resulting 
damages.245 The standard of proof under chapter 21E's strict liability 
scheme thus, is significantly lower than the proof of culpable or re-
sponsible conduct required under common law tort theories.246 
Until the recent Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decision 
in Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., no Massachusetts cases ad-
dressed whether a plaintiff may recover for economic losses under 
chapter 21E. 247 Only the statute itself served as a guide to interpreting 
this issue. The first section of chapter 21E which addresses the recov-
ery of economic losses is § 4 which creates a private right of action 
authorizing any party who "undertakes assessment, containment, or 
removal action[s]" to recover its related expenses from the party 
responsible for the hazardous waste contamination.24s Under § 4, how-
ever, the injured party may only recover costs related to assessment, 
containment, and removal of the contamination.249 The clean-up and 
response costs recoverable under § 4 of the statute do not include 
economic losses such as lost profits and business interruption losses.25o 
The Massachusetts Legislature did recognize, however, that eco-
nomic losses may be incurred in responses to contamination.251 Section 
4 of chapter 21E provides that "any person ... who provides care, 
assistance or advice in response to a release or threat of release of oil 
242 ch. 21E, § 5(a)(5)(iii). 
243 See id. 
244 ch. 21E, § 5; Rosenblatt & Floyd, supra note 1, at 1507. 
245 ch. 21E, § 5. 
246 Rosenblatt & Floyd, supra note 1, at 1507. 
247 613 N.E.2d 92 (Mass. 1993). 
248 ch. 21E, § 4. 
249Id. 
250 Id. 
251Id. 
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into or onto the tidal waters of the United States ... and such care, 
assistance or advice is consistent with applicable state law, or the 
National Contingency Plan ... shall not be liable, ... , for removal 
costs or damages which result from actions taken or omitted to be 
taken in the course of providing such care, assistance, or advice 
.... "252 Section 4 then defines damages, for the purposes of these 
persons, as including "economic loss of any kind for which liability may 
exist under the laws of this state resulting from, arising out of or 
related to the discharge or threatened discharge of oil."253 
The only remaining means, beyond § 4, through which a business 
may recover economic losses is by showing that these losses are 
provided for in § 5 of chapter 21E.254 Section 5 of chapter 21E states 
that "any person who otherwise caused or is legally responsible for a 
release or threat of release of oil or hazardous material . . . shall be 
liable, without regard to fault, ... to any person for damage to his real 
or personal property incurred or suffered as a result of such release 
or threat of release .... [S]uch liability shall be joint and several."255 
In order for a business to recover economic losses under § 5, it must 
prove that these losses are damages to "personal property."256 The 
statute, however, does not define personal property and it is, there-
fore, unclear whether economic losses may be recovered under this 
provision.257 Very little legislative history regarding chapter 21E ex-
ists, and none explains whether the legislature intended economic 
losses to be recovered under § 5.258 Since this phrase is the key to the 
recovery of purely economic losses under chapter 21E, it is important 
to understand what the Massachusetts Legislature intended to in-
?152Id. 
?153 Id. 
?154 ch. 21E, § 5. 
?155 ch. 21E, § 5(a)(5)(iii). 
?156 ch. 21E, § 5. 
?157 See generally ch. 21E, §§ 1-18; ch. 21E, § 5(a)(5)(iii). 
?158 Robert D. Cox, Jr. & Barry A. Bachrach, Damages for Contaminated Property, BOSTON 
B. J., July/Aug. 1993, at 19 & nA. Since 1983, chapter 21E has experienced eight different 
revisions and has yet to define damages to "personal property." Id. Another possible means by 
which businesses may recover economic losses in environmental cases in Massachusetts is under 
chapter 93A. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2 (West 1984 & Supp. 1993). Rosenblatt & 
Floyd, supra note 1, at 1507. Chapter 93A prohibits the unfair and deceptive acts or practices 
by businesses. ch. 93A, § 2. Under the broad remedial purpose of the statute, anyone who 
discloses only partial information that is misleading, has a duty to reveal all the material facts 
he is aware of in order to avoid deceiving the other party. V.S.H. Realty, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 
757 F.2d 411, 414 (1st Cir. 1985). In disallowing unfair practices, the statute also allows for the 
recovery of economic damages including lost profits and other pecuniary losses. Id.; Rosenblatt 
& Floyd, supra note 1, at 1507. 
540 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 21:511 
clude within the term "personal property." This may be accomplished 
by examining how Massachusetts, as well as other courts, legisla-
tures, and commentators have defined the term. 
b. Personal Property 
The term "personal property" is not typically defined by courts, 
legislatures, or commentators in one, easily understandable fashion, 
but is subject to a variety of definitions and explanations.259 In general, 
real property is defined as property in land, and in the theoretically 
permanent attachments to land, such as houses, barns and buildings.26o 
Personal property is then defined as "all other things which are sub-
ject to individual rights, whether they be tangible [like chattels] or 
intangib Ie ."261 
The variations on the definitions of personal property, however, are 
many. Personal property has been defined as all objects and rights, 
tangible or intangible, that are the subject of ownership.262 Then too, 
personal property has been defined as all things that are the subject 
of ownership that are not real estate, such as goods, chattels, money, 
notes, bonds, stocks, and choses in action.263 Personal property has 
also been defined as intangible property, or "property which cannot 
be touched because it has no physical existence such as claims, inter-
ests and rights."264 
Statutes often specify which items are to be included within the 
category personal property.265 Some statutes include a broad range of 
items, such as goods, chattels, choses in action, evidences of debt, and 
money.266 Other objects and rights often defined by statutes to com-
259 See infra notes 260-70 and accompanying text. 
260 ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 1.4, at 12 (West 1984); JOHN 
E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 1, at 9 (3d ed. 
1989). 
261 CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 260, § 1 at 9. 
262 63A AM. JUR. 2D Property § 21 (1984). The right of a creditor to be paid, for example, has 
been held to qualify as personal property. [d. § 25. 
2m BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1217 (6th ed. 1990). 
264 [d. 
265 63A AM. JUR. 2D Property § 21 (1984). 
266 [d. § 21 & n.70; see also Board of Com'rs v. Leonard, 46 P. 960, 960 (Kan. 1896) (personal 
property included "every tangible thing which is the subject of ownership, not fonning part or 
parcel of real property; also, all tax-sale certificates, judgments, notes, bonds and mortgages, 
... capital stock, ... share or interest in such stock, ... share or interest in any vessel .... "); 
Re Jones' Estate, 65 N.E. 570, 573 (N.Y. 1902) (personal property included "chattels, money, 
things in action, and all written instruments themselves, as distinguished from the rights or 
interests to which they relate, by which any right, interest, lien, or encumbrance in, to, or upon 
property, or any debt or financial obligation, is created acknowledged, evidenced, transferred, 
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prise intangible personal property include "claims represented by 
bank accounts, promissory notes, corporate and government bonds, 
shares of corporate stock, life insurance policies, and annuities, as well 
as patents, copyrights, trademarks, and even the 'goodwill' of busi-
ness enterprises."267 In addition, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court held that intangible personal property included contractual 
obligations.268 
On the other hand, some statutes narrowly define personal prop-
erty to include only chattels or tangible property and to exclude 
incorporeal rights.269 These statutes often use qualifying language 
such as "tangible" to limit the meaning of personal property within 
the context of the statute.270 
IV. MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL COURTS DENIAL OF 
RECOVERY FOR ECONOMIC LOSSES UNDER CHAPTER 21E 
A Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co. 
Despite the trends in the common law and state statutory schemes, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court comprehensively ad-
dressed the issue of the recovery of purely economic losses under 
chapter 21E and held that personal property, as used in § 5, referred 
only to tangible personal property and, thus, did not include purely 
economic losses.271 In Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., Garweth 
sought to recover damages allegedly caused by Boston Edison due to 
a release of fuel oil while Garweth was performing a contract with the 
Boston Water and Sewer Commission (BWSC).272 The oil leak, ema-
nating from a Boston Edison facility, migrated to areas where Gar-
weth was performing construction work for the BWSC.273 Boston 
Edison then hired Clean Harbors, Inc. (CHI) to clean up the release.274 
discharged, or defeated, wholly or in part, and everything, except real property, which may be 
the subject of ownership."). 
267 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 260, § 1.4 at 12. 
268 Treasurer and Receiver General v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 446 N.E.2d 1376, 
1382 (Mass. 1983). 
26963A AM. Ju&. 2D Property § 21 (1984). 
270 [d. 
271 Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 613 N.E.2d 92, 94 (Mass. 1993). The Supreme Judicial 
Court first addressed this issue in Hurley v. Carnell-Du1jilier Electronics Corp., when the 
Federal District Court of Massachusetts upheld a motion in limine by the defense to keep out 
evidence of economic loss under chapter 21E because "personal property" should only apply to 
tangible property. D. Mass, 85-1417-T. 
272 613 N.E.2d at 93. 
273 [d. 
274 [d. 
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Garweth claimed that due to this spill, coupled with the subsequent 
clean-up effort, it incurred monetary damages from a 157 -day delay 
in completing its contract with BWSC.275 Garweth also claimed losses 
due to damage to a piece of its machinery, a compressor, which was 
struck by an unidentified vehicle during the clean-up process.276 Gar-
weth's complaint was based on negligence, tort-based strict liability, 
and chapter 21E.277 
Applying the physical injury rule preventing the recovery of purely 
economic losses without accompanying physical injury or property 
damage,278 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected Gar-
weth's arguments for the recovery of economic losses under both 
negligence and strict liability theories.279 The court stated that this 
rule has been traditionally applied in a Garweth-type situation where 
a defendant negligently interferes with a contract or economic oppor-
tunity without causing harm to the person or property of another.280 
The court rejected Garweth's contention that the damage to the com-
pressor was sufficient to satisfy the physical property damage re-
quirement of the physical injury rule.281 The court stated that the 
damage to the equipment was due, not to Boston Edison's negligence, 
but to the efforts of CHI acting as an independent contractor hired 
to clean up the fuel oil spill.2B2 The court also rejected Garweth's 
argument that the physical injury rule was inapplicable to environ-
mental contamination cases.283 Garweth argued that other courts have 
prevented the application of the physical injury rule in pollution 
cases.2B4 The court held, however, that even if those decisions were of 
precedential value, they were inapplicable to the facts of Garweth.285 
275Id. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. 
278 Id.; Bay State-Spray & Provincetown S.S., Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 533 N.E.2d 1350, 
1353 (Mass. 1989); Stop & Shop Companies, Inc. v. Fisher, 444 N.E.2d 368, 371 (Mass. 1983); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 766C (1977). 
279 Garweth, 613 N.E.2d at 93-94. 
200 Id. at 94. 
281Id. at 93-94. 
282 Id. 
283 Id. at 94. 
284 Id. In Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, commercial fishermen were entitled to recover economic 
losses incurred after an oil spill interfered with their use of the sea. 501 F.2d 558, 568-70 (9th 
Cir. 1974). In Birchwood Lakes Colony Club, Inc. v. Medford Lakes, the owners of lakeside 
property were entitled to sue for damages from pollution of the lake from a nearby sewer 
treatment plant on a nuisance theory. 449 A.2d 472, 479 (N.J. 1982). 
285 Garweth, 613 N.E.2d at 94. 
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The court then analyzed and rejected Garweth's claim for economic 
losses under chapter 21E.286 Garweth relied on § 5 of chapter 21E to 
argue that its losses should be categorized as damages to "personal 
property."2!f7 The judge ruled, however, that personal property is 
defined to mean only tangible personal property.288 The court thus, 
held that because Garweth's claim was based only on economic losses 
arising out of a contract with a third party whose property was 
contaminated from the oil release, Garweth's losses were not damages 
to personal property.289 The court stated that the Massachusetts Leg-
islature did not intend to allow for the recovery of economic losses 
which are not the direct result of environmental damage.29o Rather, 
the purpose of chapter 21E is "to clarify and improve the Common-
wealth's capability for responding to releases of oil and hazardous 
materials and to recover response costs from persons responsible for 
releases for which it has incurred such costS."291 
Finally, the court stated that its conclusion was in keeping with 
CERCLA, chapter 21E's analogous federal counterpart.292 The court 
observed that CERCLA allows for a private right of action by those 
incurring "injury" due to a cleanup or response to a hazardous mate-
rial problem.293 Given the lack of injury in Garweth, the court argued 
that its holding, prohibiting the recovery of economic losses, was 
within the purview of CERCLA.294 
B. Garweth Flawed 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's analysis in Garweth is 
flawed. First, it fails to give due consideration to the various devel-
oping trends in the common law, as well as in state statutory schemes. 
While the particular facts of Garweth may warrant a finding that 
economic losses should not be recoverable, the court needlessly used 
drastic measures to arrive at that result and in doing so, ignored 
various reasons to provide for the recovery of purely economic losses. 
While the physical injury rule, barring the recovery of purely eco-
286 [d. at 94-95. 
287 [d. at 94. 
288 [d. 
289 [d. 
290 [d. 
291 [d. at 95 (citing Nassr v. Commonwealth, 394 Mass. 767, 774,477 N.E.2d 987, 992 (1985), 
(quoting St. 1983, c. 7, emergency preamble». 
292 Garweth, 613 N.E.2d. at 95. 
293 [d. 
294 See id. 
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nomic losses, has generally been upheld, recent trends have led courts 
to recognize the inappropriate nature of such a bright line standard 
in a modern industrial society.295 To avoid harsh results, courts have 
created various exceptions to the rule and have explored alterna-
tive theories to determine liability for economic 10ss.296 Second, while 
CERCLA regulates many aspects of hazardous waste liability, it 
grants states flexibility to adopt more comprehensive statutes gov-
erning broader aspects ofliability.2!17 Various state Superfund statutes 
have taken this lead and have provided for the recovery of economic 
losses for environmental hazardous waste releases.298 Third, as a mat-
ter of statutory construction, the drafters of chapter 21E purposely 
chose to employ the term "personal property," and the legislature 
adopted the provision in its entirety without qualification.299 Thus, 
chapter 21E must be interpreted as having the "plain meaning" of the 
words used in the statute so that "personal property" includes intan-
gible, as well as tangible property.300 Fourth, the recovery of purely 
economic losses complies with the purpose behind chapter 21E and is 
provided for in § 4 of that statute.301 
1. Exceptions to the Physical Injury Rule Ignored 
The Garweth court cites the physical injury rule to derive its hold-
ing preventing Garweth's recovery of its purely economic 10sses.302 
The court, however, fails to sufficiently review the many exceptions 
to this rigid rule invoked by prior courts when the results of a case 
would otherwise be inequitable.3°O While the Supreme Judicial Court 
states that there are cases in which plaintiffs have been allowed to 
recover damages for economic losses, it summarily dismisses them as 
inapplicable to Garweth's situation.304 
The court focused on the Union Oil case which involved a group of 
commercial fishermen who experienced economic losses due to an oil 
spill and were subsequently allowed to recover for those 10sses.305 The 
296 See supra notes 84-99 and accompanying text. 
296 See supra notes 100--76 and accompanying text. 
2!17 See supra notes 213-15 and accompanying text. 
298 See supra notes 216--33 and accompanying text. 
299 MASS. GEN. L. ch 21E, § 5 (1992). 
300 See Kernochan, Statutary Interpretatian: An Outline of Method, 3 DALHOUSIE L.J. 333, 
338-45 (1976). 
301 See infra notes 335-45 and accompanying text. 
311l Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 613 N.E.2d 92, 93-94 (Mass. 1993). 
300 Id.; supra notes 100--76 and accompanying text. 
304 Garweth, 613 N.E.2d at 94. 
3!Xi Id. at 94; Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558, 568-70 (9th Cir. 1974). 
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court stated that these facts were too dissimilar to provide guidance 
in determining the outcome in Garweth.3OO The facts of Union Oil, 
however, are similar to the situation in Garweth in that both cases 
involve a scenario in which a hazardous substance release has nega-
tively affected the livelihood of a plaintiff who used the contaminated 
property.307 Then too, the Garweth plaintiff's intimate interest in its 
contract to perform services may be viewed as even stronger than 
the Union Oil plaintiff's interest in using a public waterway to which 
he had no intimate claim.308 In fact, such a contractual obligation has 
been held by one Massachusetts court to constitute intangible per-
sonal property.309 Thus, the court too quickly accepted and applied the 
physical injury rule without fairly considering the exceptions that 
other courts have instituted to escape the harshness and inflexibility 
of the physical injury rule and to allow for the recovery of purely 
economic losses. 
2. Reliance on CERCLA Misguided 
The Supreme Judicial Court also relies too heavily on the likenesses 
between chapter 21E and CERCLA to support its holding in Gar-
weth.310 In addressing Garweth's chapter 21E claim, the court states 
that its holding prohibiting the recovery of purely economic losses 
undtr chapter 21E is consistent with CERCLA, the statute upon 
which chapter 21E is based.311 The court states that "under CERCLA, 
a private right of action is permitted for those who suffer injury 
resulting from a cleanup or response to a hazardous material prob-
lem."3l2 
The court, however, fails to recognize the significant differences 
between CERCLA and chapter 21E arising from the cooperative and 
flexible relationship between the two statutes.3l3 CERCLA explicitly 
provides for a cooperative effort between the federal government and 
the states to clean up hazardous waste releases.3l4 CERCLA also 
provides states with discretion to expand on the federal statute.3l5 
306 Garweth, 613 N.E.2d at 94. 
307 See id. at 93; Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 568--70. 
308 See Garweth, 613 N.E.2d at 93; Union Oil, 501 F.2d at 570. 
309 Treasurer and Receiver General v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 446 N.E.2d 1376, 
1382 (Mass. 1983). 
310 Garweth, 613 N.E.2d at 95. 
311 [d. 
312 [d. 
313 See Warren, supra note 14, at 10,348. 
314 [d. 
315 [d. 
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Thus, many states, including Massachusetts, have enacted mini-Su-
perfund statutes that, while similar to CERCLA, differ in many re-
spects.316 Chapter 21E significantly differs from CERCLA in various 
ways. For example, while CERCLA only applies to hazardous waste 
contamination, chapter 21E applies to oil releases as well.317 In addi-
tion, CERCLA provides only for the recovery of necessary response 
costs,318 while chapter 21E also allows for the recovery of damages to 
real or personal property.319 
Thus, CERCLA is obviously more limited in scope than chapter 
21E and, therefore, cannot provide a useful guide for the recovery of 
purely economic losses under chapter 21E. Given the compelling dif-
ferences between the two statutes, they should not be distorted in 
order to interpret them consistently.32o The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court itself stated that " ... where the Federal provision is 
significantly different from the State provision, . . . reference to a 
Federal statute in an attempt to determine the intent of the Massa-
chusetts Legislature would be both unnecessary and improper."321 The 
Supreme Judicial Court also stated that "if the language of a statute 
differs in material respects from a previously enacted analogous Fed-
eral statute which the Legislature appears to have considered, a 
decision to reject the legal standards embodied or implicit in the 
language of the Federal statute may be inferred."322 Thus, the Su-
preme Judicial Court in Garweth should have refused to mold its 
interpretation of chapter 21E on a provision of CERCLA that was 
significantly different from the Massachusetts law.323 
The court, thus, could have interpreted chapter 21E to reach be-
yond CERCLA and to allow for the recovery of purely economic 
losses as other states previously have done.324 While not all states 
316 [d. 
317 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 4 (1992); see supra note 237 and accompanying text. Chapter 21E 
and CERCLA, although similar, are not identical. Breckenridge, supra note 15, at 19. 
318 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606, 9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
319 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 5 (1992). 
300 When statutes are virtually identical, construe one consistently with the other "absent 
compelling reasons to the contrary or significant differences in content." Griffith v. New England 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 585 N.E.2d 751, 753 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992) (quoting Rollins Envtl. Services., Inc. 
v. Superior Court, 368 Mass. 174, 180,330 N.E.2d 814 (1975)). 
321 Acme Laundry Co. v. Secretary of Envtl. Affairs, 575 N.E.2d 1086, 1092-93 (Mass. 1991) 
(citing Massachusetts Community College Council MTAINEA v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 402 
Mass. 352, 354 (1988)). 
322 Acme Laundry, 575 N.E.2d at 1093 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Boston Retirement 
Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 432-S3, 446 N.E.2d 1051 (1983)). 
323 See Acme Laundry, 575 N.E.2d at 1092-93. 
324 See supra notes 216-33 and accompanying text. 
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have adopted this approach, the recovery of purely economic losses is 
slowly finding acceptance among state hazardous waste statutes.325 
Both MERLA and the New Jersey Spill Act are two such statutes 
drafted in a more comprehensive fashion so as to impose liability for 
economic losses due to releases of hazardous waste.326 Given the posi-
tion taken by these states, as well as the opportunity left open by 
CERCLA for states to impose more comprehensive regulations, Mas-
sachusetts would be justified in allowing for the recovery of economic 
losses under chapter 21E, despite CERCLA's language to the con-
trary.327 In fact, that is exactly what the Massachusetts Legislature 
intended to do by holding persons liable for damage to "real or per-
sonal property" in § 5.328 
3. Legislative Intent 
The court is also short-sighted when it concludes that the term 
personal property in chapter 21E applies only to tangible personal 
property because the Legislature likely did not intend to create a 
cause of action for the recovery of economic losses without accompa-
nying property damage.329 In the past, however, when state legisla-
tures have desired to narrow the scope of the term personal property, 
they have explicitly used the adjective "tangible" as a qualification in 
the statute itself.330 The Massachusetts Legislature, however, pur-
posely included liability for damage to personal property under chap-
ter 21E without limiting its meaning to only tangible personal prop-
erty.33l In addition, the term personal property could have been 
excluded from the statute during the legislative process as it was in 
CERCLA, yet the Massachusetts Legislature voted to include it.332 
Given the lack of any qualifying language employed to limit the mean-
ing of the term personal property in the context of chapter 21E, the 
broad definitions of personal property should apply so as to include 
intangible, as well as tangible property.333 It is thus logical that a 
business' right to receive "the fruits of its labor" is such an intangible 
325 See supra notes 216--33 and accompanying text. 
326 See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
327 See supra notes 213-33 and accompanying text. 
328 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 5 (1992). 
329 Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 613 N.E.2d 92, 94 (Mass. 1993). 
33°63A AM. JUR. 2D Praperty § 21 (1984). 
331 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 5 (1992). 
332 See id. 
333 [d.; 63A AM. JUR. 2D Praperty § 21 (1984). 
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personal property interest that chapter 21E contemplates when it 
imposed liability for damages to personal property.334 
4. Purpose Behind Chapter 21E 
The court also states that the recovery of economic losses under 
chapter 21E runs counter to the purpose of chapter 21E, "to clarify 
and improve the Commonwealth's capability for responding to re-
leases of oil and hazardous material and to recover response costs 
from persons responsible for releases for which it has incurred such 
costS."335 The court then, focusing on the second prong of the statute's 
stated purpose, concluded that chapter 21E did not mandate the re-
covery of economic losses in this case because Garweth never brought 
a claim for the recovery of response costs-costs of assessment, con-
tainment, or removal of hazardous substances.336 Yet, if the Massachu-
setts Legislature intended chapter 21E to provide only for the recov-
ery of response costs, the inclusion of § 5(a)(5)(iii), providing that 
anyone responsible for a release of hazardous waste shall be liable to 
any person for damage to his real or personal property due to the 
release, would be superfluous.337 What other purpose could this clause 
serve, but to allow plaintiffs who have suffered personal property 
losses due to hazardous waste releases, to recover their losses from 
those responsible? The court thus infers from chapter 21E, a purpose 
so limited that, if exclusively relied upon, would render this provision 
of the statute meaningless.338 
The court more accurately reflects the overall purpose of chapter 
21E in the first prong of its standard when it describes the statute's 
object to provide the Commonwealth with a more efficient and effec-
tive means to clean up hazardous substance releases.339 Providing for 
the recovery of purely economic losses would certainly achieve that 
goal. In a modern industrial society, encouraging those who are in-
volved with hazardous waste to exhibit caution and care during their 
utilization of these wastes is crucial. Potential liability for the purely 
economic effects of hazardous waste releases would deter those who 
use, own, transport, or store these substances from carelessly releas-
ing them into the environment. Such deterrence would thus minimize 
334 Rosenblatt & Floyd, supra note 1, at 1507. 
335 See Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 613 N.E.2d 92, 95 (Mass. 1993). 
336 Id. 
337 See ch. 21E, § 5(a)(5)(iii). 
338 See Garweth, 613 N.E.2d at 95. 
339 Id. 
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the amount of environmental contamination necessary for the Com-
monwealth to clean up and thereby effectuate this purpose of chapter 
21E.340 
5. Damages Defined in Chapter 21E 
Lastly, the Court chose to ignore the definition of damages encom-
passing economic losses provided in chapter 21E § 4.341 Section 4 
states that "any person ... who provides care, assistance or advice in 
response to a release or threat of release of oil into or onto the tidal 
waters of the United States ... and such care, assistance or advice is 
consistent with applicable state law, or the National Contingency Plan 
... shall not be liable, ... for removal costs or damages which result 
from actions taken ... in the course of providing such care, assistance, 
or advice .... "342 The statute then defines damages for purposes of 
that paragraph as "any damages, costs, expenses or economic loss of 
any kind for which liability may exist under the laws of this state 
resulting from ... the discharge ... of oil."343 While this definition is 
specific to protecting clean-up workers from liability, the legislature 
specifically recognizes that economic losses will likely result from such 
releases.344 While § 4 provides those who assist in restoring the envi-
ronment with an exclusion from liability, this definition implies that 
those who cause similar releases should also be liable for economic 
losses incurred as a result of their conduct.345 
V. A SOLUTION: AMEND CHAPTER 21E 
The Massachusetts Legislature should follow the lead taken by 
various courts and legislatures to explicitly provide for the recovery 
of economic losses under chapter 21E. This would prevent a forced 
interpretation of the term "personal property" in chapter 21E to 
include only tangible property so as to achieve results consistent with 
the physical injury rule to per se bar recovery for purely economic 
losses. Such a per se rule is inappropriate in a modern industrial 
society replete with hazardous waste releases. The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court's narrow interpretation of personal property 
to include only tangible property, while consistent with the physical 
340 See id. 
341 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 4 (1992). 
342Id. 
343Id. 
344Id. 
345 See id. 
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injury rule, is archaic and incompatible with the evolving common law, 
as well as with the approaches taken by various state legislatures.346 
Rather, the Massachusetts Legislature should take the initiative and 
amend chapter 21E to define personal property as including intangi-
ble, as well as tangible property and thus, provide for the recovery 
of purely economic losses.347 The Massachusetts courts have already 
categorized contractual obligations as personal property.348 The courts 
should now also include a business' rights to its profits within the 
rubric of personal property.349 This amendment may be implemented 
either by simply adding "tangible or intangible" to qualify the term 
personal property in § 5, or by explicitly stating in § 5 that persons 
may be liable for damages to real or personal property "including 
economic losses."350 
Such an amendment by itself, however, would be undesirable be-
cause, as the advocates for the physical injury rule convincingly ar-
gue, unlimited recovery for economic losses may result in unlimited 
defendant liability, frivolous claims, mass litigation, and liability dis-
proportional to the defendant's fault.351 Thus, while a per se rule de-
nying liability is unnecessary, there exists a need to impose some limit 
on the recovery of purely economic losses.352 As the People Express 
court stated, the need to curtail recovery for economic losses 
supports only a limitation on, not a denial of, liability. The physical 
harm requirement capriciously showers compensation along the 
path of physical destruction, regardless of the status of circum-
stances of individual claimants. Purely economic losses are borne 
by innocent victims, who may not be able to absorb their losses 
.... In the end, the challenge is to fashion a rule that limits 
liability but permits adjudication of meritorious claims. The as-
serted inability to fix crystalline formulae for recovery on the 
differing facts of future cases simply does not justify the whole-
sale rejection of recovery in all cases.353 
Thus, a balance between limiting liability, while allowing for the 
recovery of economic losses, is encouraged.354 Various courts have 
346 See Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 613 N.E.2d 92, 94 (Mass. 1993); see supra notes 
84--176,216-33 and accompanying text. 
347 See supra notes 295-345 and accompanying text. 
348 Treasurer and Receiver General v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 446 N.E.2d 1376, 
1382 (Mass. 1983). 
349 See Rosenblatt & Floyd, supra note 1, at 1507. 
350 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 5 (1992). 
351 See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text. 
352 People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail, 495 A.2d 107, 111 (N.J. 1985). 
353 ld. 
354 See id. 
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tried to achieve this balance through the use of such theories as duty, 
proximate cause, foreseeability, special injury, and direct versus indi-
rect harm.355 Many of these methods, however, have been applied in a 
haphazard fashion leaving no concise standard of law regarding when 
purely economic losses may be recovered.356 While these theories are 
useful measuring sticks when dealing with certain harms, the courts 
should adopt a more fair and evenhanded approach to imposing liabil-
ity for economic losses due to the release of hazardous substances into 
the environment.357 
A. A Standard of Recovery 
The approach that the Massachusetts Legislature and courts should 
adopt in the chapter 21E context is the approach applied in People 
Express v. Consolidated Rail Corp. and seconded by commentators-
to impose liability for economic losses when the defendant could fore-
see the type of harm that his or her actions would cause to a particular 
plaintiff class, and when the defendant's conduct was the proximate 
cause of a particularly forseeable injury to the plaintiff's economic 
interests.358 Courts have used this approach to evenhandedly hold 
responsible parties liable for economic losses.359 In People Express, 
the court held that the defendant had a duty to exercise reasonable 
care to avoid the risk of inflicting economic damages on a particular, 
identifiable class of plaintiff that the defendant knew or should have 
known was likely to suffer economic losses because of the defendant's 
conduct.360 A defendant who breached this duty would be held liable 
355 See supra notes 107-63 and accompanying text. 
356 See Pruitt v. Allied Chemical Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 979--80 (E.D. Va. 1981); see supra 
notes 100-76 and accompanying text. For example, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia in Allied, realizing the possibility of an infinite number of potential 
plaintiffs, sought to limit liability by instituting a bar to recovery to certain plaintiff classes. 523 
F. Supp. at 979~O. The method the court used to limit liability was purely subjective and 
involved distinguishing between damages that were sufficiently direct to allow for recovery and 
those that were too indirect to deserve compensation. [d. The court in Allied drew the line 
arbitrarily at the water's edge when determining which economic losses were sufficiently direct 
so that equity and fairness would be preserved. [d. at 980. Yet, by drawing the line where it 
did, the court implied that the damages incurred by those plaintiffs beyond the water's edge 
were not as deserving of compensation as the "direct" damages suffered by those closer to the 
water. See id. This reasoning is invalid because restaurateurs and seafood dealers certainly lose 
as much from the damaged Bay ecology as boat, bait and tackle shops. See id. 
357 People Express, 495 A.2d at 111. 
358 [d. at 11&-18; Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1202-06. 
359 See People Express, 495 A.2d at 11&-18. 
360 [d. at 116. "Thus, knowledge or special reason to know of the consequences of the tortious 
conduct in terms of the persons likely to be victimized and the nature of the damages likely to 
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for economic losses that were proximately caused by his failure to 
exercise this duty.361 Thus, the court used as a liability limiting device, 
the requirements that the defendant be able to identify a particular 
class of plaintiff, and that the defendant's actions be the proximate 
cause of a particularly foreseeable injury to the plaintiff's economic 
interests.362 Through these requirements, the court instituted an ele-
ment of foreseeability with respect to both identifying a plaintiff class, 
as well as the type of harm it would incur.363 
In order to determine what constitutes an identifiable class of plain-
tiff, the People Express court focused on a variety of factors-the 
probability of their presence near the scene, the number of plaintiffs 
who would be injured, the type of individuals who would be affected, 
and the type of economic expectations that such individuals pos-
sessed.364 The court also required that the defendant be able to foresee 
this class of plaintiff with particularity.365 A foreseeable class of plain-
tiffs is insufficient.366 Rather, "an identifiable class of plaintiffs must 
be particularly foreseeable in terms of the type of persons or entities 
comprising the class, the certainty or predictability of their presence, 
the approximate numbers of those in the class, as well as the type of 
economic expectations disrupted."367 Thus, a member of the general 
public, a serviceman, or a nearby traveler, would not constitute an 
identifiable plaintiff class even though they may be foreseeable be-
cause their presence was merely fortuitous, and their economic injury 
suffered would be hard to ascertain.368 
be suffered will suffice to impose a duty upon the tortfeasor not to interfere with economic 
well-being of third parties." [d. at 115; Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1204. 
361 People Express, 495 A.2d at 116. 
3f{!. [d. at 116-18. 
368 [d. at 116. 
364 [d. The factors in People Express that led the court to hold that a cause of action had been 
satisfied were the proximity of the People's terminal to the freight yard, the nature of the 
plaintiff's operations, the particular foreseeability of economic losses resulting from an accident 
and evacuation, the defendant's actual knowledge of the dangerous properties of the chemicals, 
and the existence of an emergency response plan prepared by defendants calling for nearby 
areas to be evacuated to avoid harm caused by an explosion. [d. at 118. 
366 [d. at 116; Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1205. 
366 People Express, 495 A.2d at 116; Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1205. 
367 People Express, 495 A.2d at 116. 
368 [d. An example of this identifiable class standard can be seen in Pruitt v. Allied Chemical 
Corp. 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981). In Allied, the defendant was able to foresee that certain 
seafood wholesalers, retailers, processors, distributors and restaurateurs would be in the vicin-
ity of the release. [d. at 97~. It could also have known the number and type of such plaintiffs 
who would be injured by a release of hazardous materials into the Bay, as well as their economic 
expectations of profit from the Bay. [d. Thus, under the Peaple Express approach to the 
recovery of economic losses, the plaintiffs in Allied would have had a greater chance of recov-
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Then too, the court used the standard of particular foreseeability 
to determine whether the economic injury was proximately caused by 
the defendant's conduct and thus, compensable.369 Factors examined 
by courts to determine whether economic injury was proximately 
caused consist of whether the economic injury was close in time and 
space, whether the defendant had ample opportunity to ascertain 
the identity and nature of the plaintiff's interests, and whether the 
amount of litigation and extent of liability was finite, as opposed to 
expansive.370 Thus, "economic losses are recoverable as damages when 
they are the natural and probable consequence of a defendant's neg-
ligence in the sense that they are reasonably to be anticipated in view 
of defendant's capacity to have foreseen that the particular plaintiff 
or identifiable class of plaintiffs, ... , is demonstrably within the risk 
created by defendant's negligence."371 
The Massachusetts Legislature should adopt this approach as an 
amendment to chapter 21E § 5. Such an amendment may be achieved 
by replacing the current § 5 with an increasingly modern provision 
holding responsible parties strictly liable for damage to real or tangi-
ble and intangible personal property, including economic losses when 
they are imposed by a defendant who can identify the particular 
plaintiff class that will be so injured, and when the defendant's actions 
are the proximate cause of a particularly foreseeable injury to the 
plaintiff's economic interests.372 
B. Benefits of Standard 
Commentators and courts have noted that the People Express 
standard addresses the major concerns initially responsible for the 
widespread utilization of the physical injury rule to bar recovery for 
purely economic losses.373 These sources have hailed the People Ex-
press standard as a useful method for limiting a defendant's liability, 
preventing frivolous suits and mass litigation, and assuring that liabil-
ity will be imposed in proportion to a defendant's fault.374 
ering their very real economic losses. See Allied, 523 F. Supp. at 980; People Express, 495 A.2d 
at 118. 
369 People Express, 495 A.2d at 117. 
370 [d. (construing Henry Clay v. Jersey City, 181 A.2d 545 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1962), 
aff'd, 200 A.2d 787 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964». 
371 [d. at 118 (citation omitted). 
372 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 5 (1992); People Express, 495 A.2d at 118; Hnatt, supra note 
21, at 1204. 
373 People Express, 495 A.2d at 110--11, 116-18; Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1203-06. 
374 People Express, 495 A.2d at 110--11, 116-18; Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1203-06. 
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The People Express standard provides a means for limiting the 
liability of a defendant while preventing both frivolous suits and mass 
litigation.375 In order for a defendant to be held liable for purely 
economic losses, the defendant must be able to particularly foresee 
the identifiable plaintiff class that would be harmed by its conduct, 
and the defendant's actions must be the proximate cause of a particu-
larly foreseeable injury to the plaintiff's economic interests.376 
Through this approach, liability is reserved only for those defendants 
who meet this standard, rather than encompassing all defendants who 
happen to cause economic 10ss.377 Therefore, while the potential for 
unlimited liability for economic losses is genuine, it is effectively 
allayed by a mere limitation, not a complete bar, to recovery.378 
In addition, the People Express standard imposes liability in pro-
portion to the defendant's fault through the requirement of particular 
foreseeability.379 While economic losses are often generally foresee-
able, the People Express standard requires a higher level of aware-
ness, consisting of either knowledge or particular foreseeability, in 
order to recover.3BO The court employed this approach because to 
otherwise impose liability for risks that a defendant cannot possibly 
foresee is to blindly assign liability disproportionately to the defen-
dant's fault.381 Thus, by imposing liability only for those acts which the 
defendant knows or can particularly foresee are likely to cause iden-
tifiable economic injuries to identifiable plaintiffs, the People Express 
standard imposes only proportionalliability.382 
The People Express court, as well as commentators, have also 
described this limited recovery of economic losses as consistent with 
the underlying principle of tort law-that persons wronged by others 
375 See People Express, 495 A.2d at 110-11; 116-18; Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1203-04, 1206. 
376 People Express, 495 A.2d at 118. 
377 [d. 
378 [d. at 111. 
379 See id. at 117-18. 
300 [d. at 117; see also Rickards v. Sun Oil Co., 41 A.2d 267, 269 (N.J. 1945). In Rickards, the 
court denied the plaintiff recovery :f.or losses from expectant gains when the defendant's barge 
negligently destroyed a bridge that was the only means of access to the plaintiff's business. 41 
A.2d at 268, 269-70. The court held that "no ordinary prudent person could reasonably have 
been expected to have foreseen the resultant injurious consequences .... " [d. at 269. The 
People Express court explains that this result was likely to prevent the disproportionate 
imposition of liability because the economic losses were not particularly foreseeable. 495 A.2d 
at 117. 
381 People Express, 495 A.2d at 117. 
382 [d. at 117-18. The extent of liability is dependent on the degree of foreseeability in that 
the more foreseeable that a particular plaintiff will suffer economic loss due to the defendant's 
negligence, the more reason to impose liability and allow for recovery. [d. at 115-16. 
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should be entitled to compensation for their losses from those respon-
sible for the wrong.383 In tort law, defendants are only liable for harms 
that were reasonably foreseeable risks of their actions.384 This ensures 
that defendants are punished only for damages they could have fore-
seen and taken steps to prevent.385 The People Express standard, 
through the notion of foreseeability, similarly imposes liability only on 
those defendants who could have avoided their conduct.386 
Allowing for the limited recovery of purely economic losses in the 
hazardous waste context will also serve important goals. First, the 
recovery of these losses will encourage those who deal with danger-
ous, hazardous materials to exercise tremendous care while handling, 
transporting, or storing these substances so as to avoid liability for 
their release. By imposing this threat of liability for one's wrongs, 
those involved with the use of hazardous materials will be discouraged 
from engaging in tortious behavior.387 In addition, providing for the 
recovery of purely economic losses will ensure proper compensation 
to persons or businesses harmed by releases of hazardous waste.388 
Then too, the People Express standard abolishes the physical injury 
rule's arbitrary protection of only those victims of economic loss who 
have also suffered accompanying physical injury or property dam-
age.389 In its place, this new standard provides all victims of hazardous 
waste releases with a potential avenue for legal redress.390 Under this 
standard, sufferers of purely economic losses will no longer be faced 
with the brick wall imposed by the physical injury rule which has too 
often left these plaintiffs to bear the tremendous costs of hazardous 
waste cleanup on their own.391 
The Massachusetts Legislature should, therefore, amend chapter 
21E to include economic losses within the purview of personal prop-
erty by specifically defining personal property as including intangible 
property and explicitly including economic losses within its purview.392 
Yet, to avoid unlimited liability, the legislature should also provide for 
a standard of recovery for purely economic losses similar to the stand-
383 [d. at 111; Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1203. 
384 People Express, 495 A.2d at 117. 
386 [d. 
386 See id. 
387 See id. at 111, 117. 
388 See id. at 111. 
389 See id. at 118; Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1211. 
390 See People Express, 495 A.2d at 118; Hnatt, supra note 21, at 1211. 
391 People Express, 495 A.2d at 118. 
392 See supra notes 346-50 and accompanying text. 
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ard expressed in People Express.393 Instead of imposing liability for 
all economic losses, the statute should focus on defendants who could 
particularly foresee the identifiable plaintiff class that would be 
harmed by their conduct, and whose actions were the proximate cause 
of a particularly foreseeable injury to the plaintiff's economic inter-
ests.394 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Chapter 21E seeks to provide recovery for parties that incur haz-
ardous substance clean-up costs. Allowing businesses to recover for 
purely economic losses, as well as for property damage will help to 
achieve this goal. The common law has always allowed for such eco-
nomic loss recovery when the victims of hazardous waste releases 
have also suffered physical injury or property damage. The more 
challenging question arises when a business seeks to recover eco-
nomic losses when it hasn't suffered any physical injury or property 
damage. In this situation, the common law and various state statutes 
have allowed for the recovery of these losses when it would be inequi-
table to provide otherwise. 
The Massachusetts Legislature should adopt this practice of allow-
ing businesses to recover for purely economic losses under chapter 
21E. Economic losses to businesses are often more serious than prop-
erty damages and may, in certain instances, force a business into 
bankruptcy. By allowing economic losses to be recovered as personal 
property, chapter 21E will better provide those forced to endure 
hazardous waste related losses with a chance to recover. Chapter 21E 
will also serve as a deterrent to those who deal with hazardous sub-
stances while preventing unlimited liability, frivolous suits, mass liti-
gation, and the disproportional imposition of liability. 
393 See People Express, 495 A.2d at 118. 
394 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21E, § 5 (1992); People Express, 495 A.2d at 118. 
